Introduction

Platonic Idea versus Plato's *Eidos*

The <u>Parmenides</u> dialogue is about *eide* (εἴδη, the plural form of the Greek word εἶδος, *eidos*). It is the foundation on which Plato builds everything else that he says about *eide* in eight other crucial dialogues (<u>Phaedo</u>, <u>Theaetetus</u>, <u>Sophist</u>, <u>Statesman</u>, <u>Hippias Major</u>, <u>Philebus</u>, <u>Timaeus</u> and <u>Republic</u>). But what did Plato, who coined the term, mean by *eidos*? On the answer to this question hinges our appreciation of what happened in the history of Western thought since Plato's death.

The dialogue has been transmitted down to our day from antiquity with the misleading title <u>Parmenides, or about ideas</u> (Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν). But this is not the title given by Plato. It was assigned to the text some 350 years after Plato's death by Thrasyllus, the ancient editor of Plato's dialogues and a Stoic confidant of Emperor Tiberius. The editorial decision to name the dialogue "<u>about ideas</u>*"* contradicted the fact that the dialogue is not about ideas but about *eide* and the *unity of eide*, and also contradicted the clearly stated conclusion[1] that *eide* cannot possibly be *ideas* or, indeed, any kind of mental entities.

Following Thrasyllus 250 years later (and 600 years after Plato's death), Diogenes Laertius asserts that Plato "calls the idea also *eidos*"[2]. Thus, the confusion of the two terms was never a matter of problematic translations from the Greek original to other languages. The confusion originated among the original Greek speaking readers of Plato and only intensified when translations of the dialogue into other languages were attempted.

M. Tullius Cicero, who is responsible for translating Greek philosophical terms into Latin and thus inserting them into western languages, slightly before Thrasyllus translated εἶδος into the Latinized Greek *genus,* and ἰδέα into the Latin *forma* and also *species*.

Marsilio Ficino in his comprehensive late 15th century translation of all of Plato's works (the first ever in the non-Greek West) translated εἶδος into the Latin *species* and ἰδέα into the Latinized Greek *idea*.

The critical early 16th century Stephanus edition of Plato's dialogues translated εἶδος into the Latin *species* and ἰδέα into the Latinized Greek *idea,* to which it attached the parenthetic clarification *(id est forma)*.

Modern translations have greater variety. Cherniss (1939) uses "idea" for both εἶδος and ἰδέα, a practice that was started by Jowett in 1892; A.E. Taylor (1934) uses "form" for both εἶδος and ἰδέα; Cornford (1939) uses "form" for εἶδος and "character" for ἰδέα. R.E. Allen (1997) uses "character" for εἶδος and "characteristic" for ἰδέα. Less established translations use "concept", "conception", "kind", "shape", "figure", "look", etc., variously for either εἶδος or ἰδέα or both.

---

[1] Plato, <u>Parmenides</u> 132a1-c12.
[2] Diogenes Laertius*,* <u>Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers</u> III.64

If one adds to this scandalous situation the fact that each of these terms – "idea", "form", "character", "concept", "kind", etc. – is loaded with many and different layers of meaning that have been piled up on top of each other over 24 centuries, one can safely conclude that, with all its accumulated erudition of over two millennia, the *soi disant* philosophical community has no clue (better yet, no *idea*) of what Plato is talking about in the <u>Parmenides</u>. The polite *terminus technicus* to denote this cluelessness is "Plato's most enigmatic dialogue".

This state of affairs is rooted in the original failure of the Greek speaking successors of Plato to understand why he not only goes to lengths to distinguish between εἶδος and ἰδέα but that Plato's entire thought hinges on that distinction. That original failure of Plato's Greek speaking successors is what caused the scandalous situation of translations from the time of Cicero to date.

History would have been different if Plato's word, εἶδος, had been simply transliterated into Latin as *eidos,* entered western languages in that form, and been allowed to acquire its meaning from context and usage, as had happened with so many other Greek terms either through direct transliteration ("theory", "method", "hypothesis", "idea", "mathematics", etc.) or through the coining of Latin neologisms, as Cicero did, to render vital philosophical terms initiated by Plato or Aristotle. Some key Greek philosophical terms naturalized to western languages by Cicero in this way are: ἄτομον = *individuum* = individual; ποιότης = *qualitas* = quality; ποσότης = *quantitas* = quantity; οὐσία = *essentia* = essence; ἐπ-αγωγή = *in-ductio* = induction; ἀπ-αγωγή = *de-ductio* = deduction.

The translation that follows does something similar. Instead of attempting to find a modern English equivalent to render εἶδος, a word that Plato had enlisted to serve a specific philosophical duty, I simply transliterate it as eidos (plural eide) and let it be invested with the meaning that the dialogue intends. Accordingly, Thrasyllus's title "<u>about ideas</u>" (<u>περὶ ἰδεῶν</u>) should be changed to "<u>about eide</u>" (<u>περὶ εἰδῶν</u>).

The dialectical procedure for shedding light on eidos

In this dialogue, the word eidos appears 56 times and the word idea only seven times – six of them in passages intended to draw a sharp distinction between eidos and idea[3]. Clearly, as far as the <u>Parmenides</u> dialogue is concerned, Plato's eidos and idea are two different things. But the tradition has handed down the legends of "platonic ideas" and "platonic theory of forms" based on the persistent confusion of eidos and idea.

Eidos in this dialogue is portrayed as an extra-mental object of knowledge, while idea is the mental perception that corresponds to that extra-mental object of knowledge. In addition, eidos is not material because the fleeting character of matter precludes knowledge[4], whereas *eidos* is asserted to be itself an object of knowledge[5]. How can a real entity be both

---

[3] Plato*,* <u>Parmenides</u> 132a-b, 132c-d, 133c-d, 134a9-c2, 134e9-135b2 and 135b5-c3.
[4] The driving impetus of all Greek philosophy from the outset was the puzzle of extracting *stable* objects of knowledge from an ever *changing* material world.
[5] *Op. cit*. 132c7.

extra-mental and immaterial? Also, how can it be that eidos is not separate from the material world, though itself immaterial [6]?

The first part of the dialogue (128e5-135c4) is the initial presentation by a young and inexperienced Socrates of a naïve and unworkable theory of eide, followed by the theory's merciless refutation by the elderly and experienced Parmenides. This first part ends with the gifted youngster and the wise old man concluding in agreement that the eidos is a real, extra-mental, immaterial entity, albeit not apart from the material world without which thinking cannot occur.

How is such a seemingly paradoxical thing possible and how is our mind to grasp it? One may mouth the words "**eidos is an object of knowledge which is real, extra-mental, not material but also not separate from matter**", but for the mind to grasp this paradoxical eidos in a single act of understanding – if even possible – will be the work of prolonged and laborious dialectical procedure. Such a dialectical procedure is carried out in the second part of the dialogue from 135c8 to the very end at 166c5.

What transpires in this lengthy, densely packed and very challenging second part is best understood with the help of a description of the dialectical procedure as described by Socrates in a lengthy discussion in <u>Republic</u> 531c9-535a1. The key passage that sheds light on what is going on in the <u>Parmenides</u> is: "the dialectical method alone proceeds in this way, **nullifying** the hypotheses up to the founding principle itself, where it will be secure" (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις **ἀναιροῦσα**, ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσηται»)[7].

Perhaps "nullifying" is not an adequate translation of "ἀναιροῦσα" and other translations have been suggested, such as "confuting", "doing away", "canceling out", etc. The intended meaning is not to proceed as if the hypotheses never existed but rather **to take the hypotheses into account and to subject them to a process that supersedes them, that gives rise to something, to a self-evident certainty that was not contained in the hypotheses.**

The methodical nullification of a comprehensive set of hypotheses **induces** the emergence into view of the founding principle, the "ἀρχή". It is a move to **induction**. It is precisely this method of nullification of hypotheses described in the <u>Republic</u> that the elderly Parmenides proposes in our dialogue in 136a4-c5 and subsequently carries it out by investigating the implications of each of a comprehensive set of eight hypotheses regarding the oneness of eidos.

The summary result of these eight investigations is the concluding sentence of the dialogue:

> Let us therefore say this in addition**:** that, as it seems, whether *the one is* or *is not*, both it and *the others*, both in relation to themselves and each other, all in every way both *are* and *are not* and appear and do not appear.

A more comprehensive nullification of the eight preceding hypotheses is difficult to imagine. The nullification being now complete, what remains is to make the inductive leap to the un-

---

[6] *Ibid*. 134e9-135a3.
[7] Plato, <u>Republic</u> 533c7-d4

hypothesized founding principle, the "ἀρχή", namely to state that which the dialogue seeks, to answer the question of what is the eidos. That is never spelled out by Plato. What the eidos *is not* was already spelled out in the first part of the dialogue: it *is not* a mental entity, it *is not* material and it *is not* separate from matter. But what it *is* must not be spelled out by Plato but must instead be induced by his reader as a result of experiencing this procedural nullification of hypotheses.

The reader/student will either "get it" or will not "get it". Plato's spelling it out would not generate the requisite insight in the mind of that reader/student who does not already possess the capacity to grasp what eidos is. Those who possess this capacity to see the dialectical procedure to its inductive conclusion do not need Plato to spell it out. Those who do not possess that capacity will not be helped by Plato's spelling it out and they might be harmed: having failed to "get it" after this arduous journey of hypothesis nullification, they are likely to apply any number of arbitrary interpretations on whatever Plato might spell out as an affirmative answer to the question of "what *is* eidos".

Plato's methodical refusal to provide an affirmative answer after he has provided a comprehensive pathway to the answer is his way of safeguarding truths that can only be possessed as a result of all-consuming, arduous effort. There is a difference between parroting the words of a right answer by rote and grasping its essence with the mind. Plato's spoon-feeding the right answer would only provide occasion to avoid the arduous effort and encourage the parroting.

Plato's refusal to spoon-feed lent some credence to Aristotle's unfounded claim that Plato had an "unwritten doctrine" distinct from what is found in his dialogues. In subsequent centuries, this unfortunate mistake of Aristotle was seized by mystical speculators of all types as an opportunity to claim legitimacy for their mystical views by posing as interpreters of Plato's "unwritten doctrine". This long line of mystical Neo-Platonic speculators stretches from Plotinus and Proclus to Hegel and the Tubingen School and, for the most part, is based on *imaginative* readings of the <u>Parmenides</u>.

But imagination (εἰκασία), the favored tool of the Neo-Platonists, is ranked by Plato as the lowest of our faculties, beneath the faculty of reasoning and beneath even mere opinion[8], whereas in the <u>Parmenides</u> he requires the application of the highest faculty, the pure intellect, νοῦς. The Neo-Platonic interpretations of the <u>Parmenides</u> are precisely the "barbarous cesspool[9]" against which Plato insists on deploying the demanding rigor of his dialectical method.

Some features of eidos gleaned from the nullified hypotheses

The eight hypotheses about **the one**, whether it and its many counterparts exist or do not exist are about **eidos** and the many participants. The equivalence between the one and eidos is clearly established in passage 132c7: "**eidos** be this very object that is thought to be **one**". After that point in the text, everything that is said about **the one** and its many, **the others**, applies for **eidos** and its others, its participants.

---

[8] According to the ranking of faculties in the <u>Republic</u> 533e7-534a5.
[9] <u>Republic</u> 533d1: «ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ».

The first hypothesis examines the implications of **the one** viewed simply as pure oneness and concludes that a pure and simple one cannot exist, cannot even be thought, let alone spoken. To be one it has to be some single thing. It has to be something. It has to have being. If it is absolutely and simply one without being a certain one thing, a something, it is apart from existing things, it lacks being.

The second hypothesis examines the implications of **the one** that is endowed with being, a one that actually exists, and concludes that the one does not have merely being in the abstract. It has ousia, substance, a particular kind of being. "Being in the abstract" is a conceptual invention that comes after Plato's time. The Greek word *to on* (τὸ ὂν) which is usually and wrongly translated as Being with a capital "B", actually means "that which is", not "Being in the abstract" but "this concrete being". For something to be an *on* (ὂν), a concrete being, it must have a particular kind of substance, an ousia (οὐσία) – a "substance" in the sense meant when we say "chemical substance".

As a result of this, the conclusion follows that this substantial one, this eidos, is no longer a simple one but has at least two parts, its oneness and its substance, and that each of these two parts also consists of oneness and substance ad infinitum. But it is also whole.

The self-multiplicative character of the eidos gives rise to **discrete multitude**, an infinite domain of definite numbers. Its character of whole gives rise to **continuous quantity**. The eidos is both one and indefinite many, both the founding principle, the ἀρχή of the multitude and the whole of the multitude both discrete and continuous.

Obviously, the eidos is seen as one in three different senses of **the one:** (1) the one as founding principle of the set, (2) the one in the sense of the set as a whole and (3) the one as a single member of the set.

Also, the fact that the eidos is whole gives rise to boundaries that both contain this whole and maintain contact what whatever is outside this whole. This eidos, **the one** that has substance, τὸ ὂν, generates the nested manifold of space. The eidos gives rise to space and space is relative to it; it is not relative to space.

Finally, because of its **unfolding** into multitude, its **becoming** a whole and a continuous quantity, the eidos gives rise to time and time is relative to it; it is not relative to time.

What is this concrete thing that has substance, this entity, this on (ὂν), which in order to be must be both one and many and a whole, and in the process of so being generate discrete number, continuous quantity, space and time?

In this haunting question the second hypothesis concludes.

The third hypothesis examines the implications for the many, the things that are **the others** of **the one**, when we assume that the one has substance. It ends by concluding that the others exist in a manner consistent with the findings of the second hypothesis.

The fourth hypothesis mirrors the first**:** what happens to those things that are **the others** of the one if **the one**, as per the first hypothesis, has no being? Hypothesizing a pure one that does not share in being makes whatever things are **the others** of this pure-and-simple one lack any characteristic and in this way mirror that non-existent one. Both it and they together are all that there is which means that both together are nothing – a prime example of hypothesis nullification.

These then are the four hypotheses that assume **the one** (either as eidos or as pure and simple oneness devoid of being) and the implications of this assumption both for **the one** itself and for **the others**.

The remaining four hypotheses examine the implications for **the one** and **the others** if we assume that the one *is not* either absolutely or relatively.

If (sixth hypothesis) **the one** is *not*, in the absolute sense that it does not exist at all, it is impossible for it even to appear to exist and this in turn (eighth hypothesis) makes it impossible even to conceive what **the others** that would correspond to it might be; neither **the one** nor **the others** exist or even appear to exist.

Further, if (fifth hypothesis) **the one** *is not*, in the relative sense that it is not something in particular but otherwise it exists, then the consequence for **the one** is that it shares in both being and not-being, and thus is subject to alteration between being and not-being and when altered it is subject to becoming and perishing and when not altered it is not subject to becoming and perishing.

Finally, if (seventh hypothesis) **the one** *is not* in this relative sense but instead it *is* in some vague and undefined sense, the consequence for **the others** is that they are others to something undefined and vague, therefore are themselves undefined and vague. Unable to be either one or many and lacking a proper other they *seem* to be each other's other, but lacking a one cannot be proper multitudes but *seem* to be unlimited bulks whose *seeming* fragments that appear smallest one moment suddenly *seem* colossal the next – a dreamlike state of seeming.

To summarize**:** hypotheses one, four, six, seven and eight are nullified by resulting in absurdities.

The remaining three hypotheses undergo nullification only if we hang on to our natural, naïve conceptions of "one", "is", "part", "whole", "time" and "space".

The second hypothesis produces a paradoxical result that describes **the one/eidos** as the constitutive entity of a peculiar ontological order: a 'thing that is', an on (ὄν) that is a singular founding principle which, *qua* a whole contains all its founded parts, *qua* the sum of its parts is contained by the whole and *qua* founding principle stands above both the whole and the sum of the parts; moreover, the founding action of this eidos gives rise to discrete number, continuous quantity, space and time.

The third hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the things which are **the other** of **the one/eidos** have the same – i.e., corresponding – paradoxical characteristics that **the one/eidos** was found to have in the second hypothesis.

The fifth hypothesis, at last, gives some first indications in what particular ways non-being *is* and how the dialectic of being and non-being drives the process of coming to be and perishing and may provide the foundation for an understanding how exactly "participation" of the many in the one is possible. (This is a theme that Plato famously elucidates further in the <u>Sophist</u>).

The conclusions of these three last hypotheses are not presented as nullifications by absurdity but rather as nullifications by paradox. For the Socratic dialectical procedure to take off from the "nullification of hypotheses" and proceed to an inductive grasp of the un-hypothesized founding principle, the ἀρχή, it must discard the absurd conclusions of the earlier hypotheses and concentrate on the implications of the paradoxical conclusions of the second, third and fifth hypotheses.

These paradoxes will not be resolved unless our notions of "one", "being", "not-being", "part", "whole", "space", and "time" are modified in ways that eliminate these apparent paradoxes.

From this dialectical induction the meaning of Plato's eidos will emerge.

Some historical drama behind the dialogue

Plato wrote this dialogue to describe a legendary event that had taken place nearly a century prior to the time of his writing and indeed before he was born. It is probably Plato's only dialogue other than the <u>Protagoras</u> that describes a conversation that occurred before his lifetime.

The time of Plato's writing was a time of utter disintegration of the classical Greek world. That entire world was continuing to be torn apart by an endless string of fratricidal wars between and within city-states that had begun in 431 B.C. with the Peloponnesian War and never ended until the year 146 B.C., when Roman legions razed to the ground Corinth (incidentally the very city-state that had been the instigator of the Peloponnesian War), and thus completed Rome's conquest of the Greek world and staunched its bleeding.

When Plato wrote the dialogue, Athens had long ago suffered its humiliating defeat in the Peloponnesian War, had seen its overseas empire destroyed, its population decimated, and its political class humbled into parochial irrelevancy and self-delusion. The great rival of Athens, the once proud Sparta that had defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, was now also impotent and humiliated by defeat at the hands of the ascendant Thebes. Persia-financed Thebes, the perennial Persia-collaborators of the Greek world, had become the temporary arbiter of Greek affairs. Virtually every political faction in every significant Greek city-state was either dependent on bribes from the Persian Court or was aspiring to be so dependent. The age of the freedom of Greek city-states was over when Plato wrote this dialogue and it was not to return ever again.

For reason, Plato sets the dramatic date of the dialogue in the summer of the year 450 B.C. If a time may be picked to mark the highest point of classical Greek civilization, the most solemn moment of its trajectory, it would be the year 450 and, more specifically, the summer of that year when a triumphant Athens was celebrating its quadrennial Great Panathenaea festival. This was the week of July 28-August 3 of 450 B.C. or, according to the Attic calendar, 23-29 of Hecatombaion in the 3rd year of the 82nd Olympiad. That was the moment of the legendary meeting between the great Parmenides, the undisputed towering intellect of his time, and the restless genius of the adolescent Socrates. That encounter produced an intellectual achievement that has yet to run its course in the history of man.

In that historic summer of 450 B.C., a brilliant alliance between Athens and Sparta, the two leading Greek city-states, had unified and was jointly leading the entire Greek universe – all 2,000-plus city-states spread from the Crimea in the Black Sea to the western Mediterranean coasts of Gaul and Iberia. This alliance had forced the entire Persian Empire into strategic retreat while allied Greek armies and navies pressed forward all across the borderlands of Western Asia and North Africa. In Athens itself, a rare, short-lived moment of civic concord prevailed between the aristocratic and democratic parties that had struck a power-sharing deal whereby the aristocrat leader Cimon shared power with the democrat leader Pericles, the first in charge of foreign and military policy the second in charge of domestic and economic affairs.

On that summer of 450 B.C. almost all the great personalities that made up the fleeting miracle of classical Greek civilization were alive: Herodotus, Thucydides, Sophocles, Euripides, Socrates, Pericles, Cimon, Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Leucippus, Empedocles, Protagoras, Gorgias, Pindar, Hippocrates, Zeuxis, Phidias, Ictinus, Callicrates, el at. These persons provide the living context for the encounter of Parmenides and Socrates that produced the astonishing thoughts recorded in the Parmenides dialogue.

In writing this dialogue, Plato situates the time, place and personalities associated with this central achievement of classical Greek civilization that he, Plato, tries to preserve for posterity. That achievement is the understanding of eidos as it emerges in the Parmenides dialogue.

The dialogue marks the launching of Socrates's philosophical career. The very same themes of this dialogue are presented again for further elaboration in a number of discussions that Socrates and others held at the end of Socrates's life a few days before his death. These discussions are recorded in the Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. They must be read as direct continuation and elaboration of the argument launched in the Parmenides or their point will be missed.

There is an important difference between the Parmenides and these seven other dialogues describing the last days of Socrates. In these latter dialogues we can be reasonably certain that Plato's reports of what the various interlocutors say in the dialogues correspond roughly with what those interlocutors actually said. All these latter dialogues supply their own evidence of the veracity of what Plato attributes to the various speakers. The Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman are based on written notes that Socrates himself proofread while in prison, as we are told by Eucleides of Megara, the dialogues' narrator and a personal friend of Socrates and Plato. If

Plato's report had not conformed with the written notes cleared by Socrates, Eucleides would have objected in ways that could not be missed by posterity. The text of the <u>Apology</u> is uncontestably what Socrates said at his trial as all Athenians of the time would have known and as Xenophon, a friend of Socrates and vocal critic of Plato, also concurs; the highly dramatic <u>Phaedo</u> not only reports what both Socrates and all those present at his death said but also records the actual names of all those present, all of whom were living when the dialogue was published. Given that most of them were notable personalities in their own right, had they thought Plato's record of the event inaccurate we would have heard from them. The same is true of the <u>Euthyphro</u> and the <u>Crito</u> dialogues – they had living eye-and-ear-witnesses at the time of publication.

Not so with the <u>Parmenides</u>. Plato here reports the proceedings at fourth hand: Cephalus, an otherwise unidentified visitor from Clazomenae, reports what he heard some time earlier from Antiphon, Plato's half-brother, who in turn heard from his older friend Pythodorus an account of what had transpired between the young Socrates and the elder Parmenides. The story of the encounter emerges from the mist of legend: the great event took place a long time ago in a golden age of victorious and free cities, national unity, civic concord, great men and great achievements, and now reaches down to us in defeated, demoralized Athens as a memory to look up to, a lesson to learn, a legacy to preserve for all mankind "as a possession for all time" as Thucydides would have said.

A poignant detail: the entirety of the elaborate, dense and intellectually exhausting arguments of that conversation of 450 B.C. is repeated word for word from memory by Plato's half-brother Antiphon who heard them and memorized them as a young boy many years before. He must have been quite a dedicated and gifted lover of wisdom back then to engage is such a nearly impossible feat of memorization. But now he is a middle aged man whose philosophical flame has gone out long ago and is now only interested in horsemanship and the breeding of horses – the traditional preoccupation of a retiring country gentleman of his time. When asked to retell the old story he objects at first to the prospect of revisiting old loves but, after some cajoling by the old acquaintance from Clazomenae and his two brothers, Antiphon's old spark flickers for a brief moment and he agrees to roam again, for one last time, in that philosophical "vast sea of words" as the great Parmenides had once called it.

Antiphon reaches deep down in his memory and retells the legendary encounter without a flaw and without a halt – perhaps the only Platonic dialogue of such intensity without the customary digression. Antiphon finishes his delivery and disappears from the stage of history never to be heard of again. Plato tips his hat to his half-brother, the defeated, retiring Athenian country gentleman who was once a lover of wisdom and now is a lover of horses and the keeper of priceless memories.

Criton M. Zoakos
1/18/2019

Plato's *Parmenides*

© 2019 Translation by Criton M. Zoakos

Encounter in the marketplace

126 ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ Ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ᾽ ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκωνι· καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Χαῖρ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἴ του δέῃ τῶν τῇδε ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.

Λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν.

b Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα.

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Αὐτῷ δέ γε;

Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνῃ;

Οἵδε, εἶπον ἐγώ, πολῖταί τ᾽ ἐμοί εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἑταίρῳ πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε,

c καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὕς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι.

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· μειράκιον γὰρ ὢν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἱππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ᾽ αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.

127 Ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἵ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὧν ἕνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἠσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει – πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι – ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ

b μεγάλα Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολιόν, καλὸν δὲ κἀγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς τῶν τετταράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν, καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγονέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ

c τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ· οἷ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ᾽

CEPHALUS: After we arrived in Athens from Clazomenae, our home, we met with Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace; and Adeimantus took me by the hand and said: Greetings, Cephalus, and if you need anything that we can do for you, say so.

But really, I said, that is exactly why I am here, to ask you a favor.

Speak then, he said, what favor?

And I said: What was the name of your maternal half-brother? I don't remember. He was just a child when I was last here from Clazomenae and a long time has passed since then. His father's name was Pyrilampes, I believe.

Indeed, he said.

And his own name?

Antiphon. But why do you ask?

These here, I said, are fellow citizens of mine, very philosophical, and they have heard that this Antiphon had many encounters with a certain Pythodorus, a companion of Zeno, and remembers the discussions that Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides once had, having heard them many times from Pythodorus.

What you say is true, he said.

Then it is these arguments that we need to hear, I said.

But that's not difficult, he said, given that he studied them thoroughly as a youngster, although now he spends most of his time with horses like his grandfather and namesake. But let us go to him if you want; he just went home from here and lives nearby in Melite.

Having said this we walked and caught up with Antiphon at home handing a bridle to a coppersmith to be fitted. After he dismissed the man, and his brothers explained to him why we were there, he recognized me from my earlier visit and embraced me; and when we asked him to recount the arguments he was reluctant at first – because, he said, it was a lot of work – but then he began to talk. Antiphon described how Pythodorus recounted that Zeno and Parmenides had once arrived for the Great Panathenaea, Parmenides being well advanced in years, white haired, of handsome and good appearance, about sixty-five years of age; and Zeno nearly forty years old then, tall and graceful looking and it was rumored that he had been Parmenides's

αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων – τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι – Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, **d** ἡνίκα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ᾽ ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.

lover. And he said that they took up residence with Pythodorus outside the wall in the Cerameicus, and that both Socrates and certain numerous others had arrived there who desired to hear from the writings of Zeno – since this was the first time they had brought them – and that Socrates was very young at that time. Zeno himself read to them while Parmenides happened to be out of the house; and Pythodorus said that it was very shortly before the rest of the arguments had been read that he came in from outside with Parmenides and Aristoteles (the one who later became one of the Thirty Tyrants), and that they heard only the little that remained of the writing; but he himself had heard Zeno's reading previously.

Young Socrates proposes separate *eide* in answer to Zeno's conundrum

Τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι, **e** καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, Πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;

Οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα. ἆρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἴει σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγῇ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσουσπερ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι **128** πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω;

Οὔκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.

Μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ᾠκειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων **b** τεκμήρια παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἓν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταὐτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι.

Ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ᾽ οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ᾔσθησαι. **c** καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι,

When Socrates finished listening, he asked that the first hypothesis of the first argument be read again and when it was read he said: How do you argue this, Zeno? That if the *things that are* are many, each ought to be both like and unlike, which is impossible because neither can the unlike be like nor the like be unlike? Isn't this how you argue?

That is how, said Zeno.

If then it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is also impossible for them to be many, for if they were they would suffer the impossible. Is this the aim of your arguments, to maintain despite everything that is said that there are not many? And do you think that each argument is proof of this very thing so that you believe you have supplied as many proofs that there are not many as you have written arguments? Is this how you argue or am I mistaken?

No, said Zeno, you understood well the aim of the whole writing.

I notice, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno here wants to cleave to you not only by means of your other love but also by his book. He has written the same thing as you, but by twisting it somehow he tries to fool us that he says something different. For you in your poems say that all reality is one, and you supply fine and good proofs; and this one again says that it is not many, and he supplies very many and very large proofs. So you say 'one' and he says 'not many' and each of you says it in such a way as to seem that you are not saying the same thing at all. To the rest of us it seems that you say things over our heads.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But you have not sensed completely the truth of my book even though you track down and hunt the arguments like a Spartan bitch. But in the first place the point that you are missing is this: the book is not quite as boastful as

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα [τὰ γράμματα] τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἓν ἔστι, πολλὰ
d καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταὐτὰ καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ᾽ ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή. ταύτῃ οὖν σε
e λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικίας οἴει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας: ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ᾽ εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπῄκασας.

Ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις
129 εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον· τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς, τί
b θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ, οὐδέ γε εἰ ἓν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὖ μετέχειν. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη
c θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὡσαύτως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐμὲ ἕν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφῆναι, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὄπισθεν, καὶ

you say my intention was in writing it, pretending to the public that it is some great achievement. In fact, you raised something incidental, whereas the actual truth is that these writings are a sort of help to Parmenides's argument against those who attempt to ridicule it by saying that, if the one *is*, the argument will suffer many ridiculous and self-contradictory consequences. This book speaks against those who argue in favor of the many and repays them with interest, intending to show that their hypothesis of many beings, if pursued far enough, is open to greater ridicule than the hypothesis of the one being. It was in such a spirit of contention that I wrote it as a youth but, when I did, someone stole it, so I could not decide whether or not it should come to light. Your mistake, Socrates, is that you imagine it was not written by a youth for the sake of contention but by an older person for the love of honor. Otherwise, as I said, you didn't surmise wrongly.

But I agree, said Socrates, and I believe it is as you say. But tell me this: don't you think that there exists by itself a certain *eidos*[10] *(εἶδος)* of likeness *per se*, and again another one opposite to it, which is the unlike, and that you and I, and *the others*[11] *(τὰ ἄλλα)* that we call many, *partake* of these *two beings*? Those that partake of likeness become like in the manner and to the degree in which they partake, those that partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those that partake of both, both? And if all things partake of both of these opposite beings, and by their *sharing in* both they are like and unlike themselves, what is there to marvel at? But if one said that likeness itself became unlike or unlikeness like, that, I think, would be remarkable; but if one says that the things that share in both undergo both, that doesn't seem out of place to me, Zeno, nor if somebody says that all things are one by sharing in the one and also are many by sharing in multitude. But it would amaze me if he shows that *the one* itself is many and the many one. And likewise with respect to all *the others*. If someone would show that the genera and *eide* in themselves undergo their opposite effects, it would be a marvel. But where is the marvel if a man were to show that I am both one and many, and when

---

[10] Plato's ***εἶδος*** (plural ***εἴδη***), has no agreed modern equivalent. Modern languages render it as "idea", "form", "species", "character", "characteristic", "kind", "shape", "figure", "look", "Begriff", "Gestalt", "Idee", "Gattungsform", "idée", "caractère", etc. In this translation the term is left untranslated and is transliterated in bold italics as ***eidos*** (plural ***eide***) and is not to be confused with *idea* (ἰδέα= idea, concept, see footnote #4 below). About the meaning of ***eidos***, see Introduction.

[11] The adjective "others" together with the definite article "the" is used as a substantive noun meaning "the many" that partake in the "one" ***eidos*** ("*the others that we call many*" in the text). The bold italicized, ***the others***, in this translation denotes this meaning rather that the ordinary adjectival meaning of "other".

ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως – πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω
– ὅταν δὲ ἕν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι
d ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ
ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ
πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ταὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὶ φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἓν
ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν, οὐδέ
τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ἂν πάντες
ὁμολογοῖμεν· ἐὰν δέ τις ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον
μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον
ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν
e καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν
ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ
διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη,
θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ
ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθα· πολὺ μεντἂν ὧδε μᾶλλον,
ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην
130 ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς
πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις διήλθετε,
οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς *λογισμῷ* λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδεῖξαι.

he wants to show that I am many he says that my
right side is one thing, my left another, my front
another, my rear another and so are my top and
bottom – so I am thought to share in many. And to
show that I am one he says that of the seven of us I
am but one man, sharing in the one; thus he shows
both. If then someone would try to show that such
things are both one and many – I mean stones and
sticks and suchlike – we shall say that he proves that
they are many and one, not that the one itself is many
or the many one, nor that he says something
marvelous, but rather what we all would admit. But if
someone were first to set *apart* [12] those very *eide* by
themselves that I was just mentioning – i.e., likeness
and unlikeness, multitude and one, rest and motion
and all such – and afterward show that these are
capable of blending and separating themselves, I
would be awed with amazement, Zeno. I think you
have dealt with these matters with great courage; but,
as I say, I would be far more awed if someone could
show that this very same impasse is in every way
knitted into the *eide* themselves, and show it in things
grasped by reason in the same way as he shows it in
things that are visible.

Parmenides questions young Socrates

Λέγοντος δή, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους
ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν <ἂν> οἴεσθαι ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἄχθεσθαι
τόν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε
αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους
βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ
οὖν καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην· ὦ
b Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς
ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω
διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, **χωρὶς** μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς
δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ
ἓν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος
ἤκουες;
Ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
Ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον
δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων;
Ναί, φάναι.
c Τί δ᾽, ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι
ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς

As Socrates was arguing these points, Pythodorus
said he feared that Parmenides and Zeno would be
vexed by them, but instead they were paying very
close attention to him and often looked at each other
smiling as if in awe of Socrates. In fact, when
Socrates stopped, Parmenides spoke up. Socrates, he
said, your passion for argument is admirable. But tell
me, did you yourself divide them in the manner you
describe, namely the *eide* themselves *apart* and the
others that share in them also *apart*? And do you
think there is likeness in itself *apart* from the likeness
that we have, and also one and many and all that you
heard from Zeno just now?

I most certainly did, said Socrates.

Such things also, said Parmenides, like an *eidos* of
the just as such in itself, and of the beautiful and the
good and generally of all such things?

Yes, he said.

And an *eidos* of man *apart* from us and from all
who are like us, an *eidos* of man in itself, or of fire or

---

[12] *Χωρίς* (apart) is a strong term used to emphasize the ontological status of **eide** as separate from the things that
participate in them. The young Socrates for the first time here asserts under questioning that the **eide** exist apart
(χωρίς) from the multitude of participants. The rest of the dialogue will first challenge and then refute this. See
Introduction.

ἢ καὶ ὕδατος;

Ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως.

Ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε **d** χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἑκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὂν ἄλλο αὖ ἢ ὧν <τι> ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή;

Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ **εἶναι**· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ᾖ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μή τι ᾖ περὶ πάντων ταὐτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μή ποτε εἴς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ᾽ οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.

even of water?

Quite often, Parmenides, I have been perplexed, he said, over whether one must speak about these as one does about the others or differently.

And of these things, Socrates, that are thought silly, such as hair, clay and dirt or some other quite worthless and foul thing – are you perplexed as to whether or not one must say that for each of these there is a separate *eidos* that is other than the things that we deal with?

Absolutely not, said Socrates, on the contrary, these things that we see are the very same things that *are*; and to imagine an *eidos* of them would be utterly absurd. But then it vexes me lest the same thing apply to all. When I get to this point I run away in fear that I may fall in an abyss of babble and perish; but when I arrive at the things that we were just now saying have *eide*, there I spend my time laboring.

1 Is partaking of young Socrates's *eide* possible?

e Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ᾽ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. τόδε δ᾽ οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῄς, εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, **131** οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι;

Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο;

Καὶ πῶς ἄν; εἶπεν.

Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἓν ὄν, ἢ πῶς;

Τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, [ἓν εἶναι];

b Ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον [εἰ] ἡμέρα [εἴη] μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὑτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη.

Ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῇ λέγειν;

c Ἴσως, φάναι.

You are still young, Socrates, Parmenides said, and philosophy has not yet seized you as one day it will, in my view, and then you will belittle none of them; but now you still have regard for people's opinions because of your youth. But tell me this: do you think, as you say, that there are *eide* from which *the others* take their name by partaking of them, such as the like things partaking of likeness, the large partaking of largeness, and those partaking of beauty and justice come to be just and beautiful?

Indeed I do, said Socrates.

Does each of the partaking things then partake of the *whole eidos* or of a part? Or is there some other kind of partaking aside from these?

How could there be? he said.

What then, do you expect is the case: that the whole *eidos*, being one, is in each of the many, or what?

What would prevent it, Parmenides, (from being one)? said Socrates.

So then, being one and the same in things that are many and apart, it would also be whole in each one of them and in this way it would be apart from itself.

Not so, he said, if it is like the day which is one and the same and in many places at once and yet not apart from itself; each *eidos* in the same way would be one and the same in all at once.

Very nice, Socrates, how you make one and the same to be in many places at once as if you threw one sail over many people and then claim that one whole is over many; or is this not what you mean to say? Maybe, he said.

Ἦ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ;

Μέρος.

Μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη.

Φαίνεται οὕτω γε.

Ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται;

Οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.

Ὅρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει

d σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται;

Πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἕξει ᾧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῳ ἔσται;

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἕξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται· ᾧ

e δ᾽ ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεῖζον ἢ πρίν.

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε.

Τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.

Τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις;

Τὸ ποῖον;

Are you then saying that the whole sail is over each man or a different part of it is over a different man?

A different part.

So Socrates, he said, these *eide* are divisible and those that share in them share a part, and the whole is not in each, but only a part of each *eidos*.

So it appears.

Are you then, Socrates, willing to say to us in truth that the one *eidos* is divided and is still one?

No way, he said.

Because you see, he said, if you divide largeness itself, and each of the many large things is large by a smaller part of largeness itself, wouldn't this therefore appear irrational?

Indeed, he said.

And when each thing receives a small part of equality and is therefore less than equality itself, could it be equal to anything?

Impossible.

And if one of us takes a part of smallness, smallness would be greater than this part given that it is part of itself, and thus smallness would be greater; and that to which the part of smallness that we have taken is added will become smaller and not greater than before.

This could not happen, he replied.

In what way then, Socrates, he said, would **the others** partake of your *eide*, if they cannot partake either by parts or by wholes?

By Zeus, he replied, I don't think it is easy to determine such a thing in any way.

What next, then? What do you think of this?

Of what?

3 Young Socrates admits *eide* cannot be ideas

132 Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ᾽ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

Τί δ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἕν τι αὖ μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;

Ἔοικεν.

Ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ᾽ αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα

I suspect you believe each *eidos* is one because of something like this: When many things seem large to you, seeing them you may imagine as you look at them that one and the same *idea*[13] (ἰδέα) applies to all of them, so you think *the large* is one.

What you say is true, he said.

But then, if likewise you see in your soul *this one large* in itself together with **the other** large things, would not yet another *large one* emerge by means of which all of these will appear large?

It seems so.

So another *eidos* of largeness will emerge, in

---

[13] Here and in all the other six passages of this dialogue where the word occurs, *ἰδέα* (*idea, concept*) is a hybrid mental/extra-mental entity, in contrast to **eidos**, which is the extra-mental object of that thought. Cf. Introduction.

b μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.	addition to the previous largeness itself and to those that share in it; and on top of all these yet another by means of which all of these are large; thus each of your *eide* will no longer be one but unlimited in multitude.

4 Young Socrates admits *eide* cannot be thoughts
132c7: "eidos be this very object that is thought to be one"

Ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων **νόημα**, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.	But, Parmenides, said Socrates, couldn't each of these *eide* be a thought which does not properly come to exist anywhere else except in souls? In this way each would be one and would not suffer the effects that you just described.
Τί οὖν; φάναι, ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;	What? Is each of these thoughts *one*, and a thought of *not-even-one* (nothing)[14]?
Ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν.	But that's impossible, he said.
Ἀλλὰ τινός;	So it is a thought of something?
Ναί.	Yes.
c Ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος;	Of something that is or of something that is not?
Ὄντος.	Of something that is.
Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν;	Is it not of some one thing which the thought (νόημα) thinks (νοεῖ) as overlaid over all, as one single *idea*?
Ναί.	Yes.
Εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;	Thus, wouldn't *eidos* be this very object that is thought to be one, always the same over all?
Ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται.	Again, it seems necessary.
Τί δὲ δή; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ᾗ τἆλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι;	What about this? said Parmenides: Since you say that *the others* share in *eide*, mustn't you believe either that each of these others comes from thoughts and they all think, or that while they are thoughts themselves they are not the objects of thought?

5 Young Socrates admits *eide* cannot be blueprints

d Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.	Then this is not reasonable either, Socrates said. But it is clear to me, Parmenides, that this is how the matter stands: that these *eide* are like blueprints in the nature of things and that *the others* resemble them and are their likenesses and the sharing of *the others* in the *eide* is nothing else than *the others* resembling the *eide*.
Εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ᾽ ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι;	Then if something resembles the *eidos*, is it possible for that *eidos* not to be like that which resembles it insofar as that thing was made to be like it? Or is there a device by which the like is not like to its like?
Οὐκ ἔστι.	There is not.
Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ᾽ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη	Is it then not very necessary for the like to share in
e ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ [εἴδους] μετέχειν;	the same *eidos* as its like?
Ἀνάγκη.	Necessary.
Οὗ δ᾽ ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος;	And this thing by whose sharing the like are like,
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.	

---

[14] A pun: the Greek word for 'nothing' is 'μηδέν' (μὴ δὲ ἕν) literally 'not-even-one'.

133 Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.

Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τἆλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.

Ἔοικεν.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὡς εἴδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ διορίζηται;

Καὶ μάλα.

would that not be the *eidos*?

Most certainly.

Therefore it is not possible for something to be like the *eidos* nor for the *eidos* to be like something else; for if it were, another *eidos* would always emerge beside the first, and if this new *eidos* is like the first, then yet another eidos would emerge and there would never be an end in the emergence of new *eide* if the *eidos* is like that which shares in it.

What you say is very true.

So it is not by likeness that **the others** partake of the *eide*. Another means of partaking must be sought.

It seems so.

You see then, Socrates, he said, what a conundrum it is if one determines that these *eide* are in and by themselves?

Very much so.

6 If the *eide* are separate they cannot be known and discourse is impossible

b Εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἅπτῃ αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις.

Πῶς δή; εἰπεῖν.

Πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἕπεσθαι, **c** ἀλλ᾽ ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι.

Πῇ δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις **d** αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὑτά ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως.

Πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Οἷον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου **e** δήπου, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ

Bear this in mind then, he said, that, if I may so put it, you are not even close to grasping how great a conundrum it is if you always posit each one *eidos* as something set apart from existing things.

How is that? he said.

Many reasons, he said, but the greatest is this: if someone said that it is not even appropriate for *eide* to be known if they are what we say they must be, it would not be possible to prove him a liar, unless whoever challenges him happens to be a person of great experience, not dim-witted, and willing to follow a multifarious, long winded demonstration; otherwise he who contends that they are necessarily unknown will remain unconvinced.

How so, Parmenides?, said Socrates.

Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who asserts that any given essence of things exists in and by itself would be the first to agree that none of these essences exists in us.

How could it be in us and still exist just in and by itself? said Socrates.

Well said, he replied.

The kinds of *ideas* that are what they are as a result of their relation to each other are those that have their essence relative to each other, but not relative to those things close to us[15], that one may call likenesses or whatever else and from which we are named by sharing in them. But the things close to us, though namesakes of those that are apart from us, are relative to each other and not to the *eide*, and are named from each other not from them.

What do you mean? said Socrates.

---

[15] "Things close to us" ("τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν") are what Socrates earlier called "the many that partake in the *eide*" as distinct from the *eide*.

αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν· αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽, ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὑτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς

134 αὑτά. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

Πάνυ γ᾽, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἑκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἣ ἔστιν, ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη: ἢ οὔ;

Ναί.

Ἡ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη

b τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι;

Ἀνάγκη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ᾽ ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Γιγνώσκεται δέ γέ που ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;

Ναί.

Ὅ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Οὐ γάρ.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας

c ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Κινδυνεύει.

Ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Φαίης ἄν που, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἄν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;

Ἀνάγκη.

d Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οἷός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;

Τί γὰρ οὔ;

Ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἴδη πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἑκάτερα.

Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ᾽ ἂν

For example, said Parmenides, if one of us is lord or slave, the slave is not slave to that which is lordship itself, and the lord is not lord of that which is slavery itself, but both are what they are as one man in relation to another. The separate lordship in itself is what it is relative to the separate slavery in itself, and similarly the separate slavery in itself relative to the separate lordship in itself; but things close to us do not have their properties relative to the things that are separate in themselves, nor do the things that are separate in themselves have their properties relative to us. But, as I say, those are in themselves and relative to themselves, and things close to us similarly are relative to each other. Don't you understand what I am saying?

I understand very well, said Socrates.

And then, he said, knowledge – namely that which is separate knowledge in itself – would be the knowledge of that which is the separate truth in itself?

Indeed.

And each kind of separate knowledge in itself would be knowledge of each separate being in itself, no?

Yes.

And is it not the case that the knowledge close to us is of the truth close to us, and, again, that each kind of knowledge close to us is the knowledge of each of the beings close to us?

Necessarily.

But as you concur, we neither have the *eide* themselves, nor is it possible for them to be close to us.

Indeed not.

But each of the separate kinds of *eide* in themselves is known by the *eidos* of separate knowledge in itself?

Yes.

And this is an *eidos* that we do not possess.

We do not.

Therefore none of the *eide* is known by us because we do not share in this separate knowledge in itself.

It seems not.

Therefore, it is unknown to us what the beautiful in itself is, and the good in itself and all those that we conceive as ideas in themselves.

I'm afraid so.

Look now at something more terrible than even this.

What?

Would you say that if there exists a genus of knowledge in itself, it is far more precise than our knowledge, and likewise in the case of beauty in itself and of all the other things in themselves?

Yes.

And if something is to have a share in knowledge

ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν,
οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ᾽
e ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ
παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ
ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκουσι τὰ
ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.

Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, <ἦ> θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις
τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης,
135 καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον
ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ
ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε
τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ
τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ
ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα, καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν
τε τὶ λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς
δυσανάπειστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς
τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου
b καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου
τοῦ εὑρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι
ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον.

Συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης·
πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ
Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς
πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι
ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν
c διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἐῶν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι
δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν
μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ᾐσθῆσθαι.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψῃ
ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;

Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι.

Πρῲ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ
d ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν. ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ
πρῴην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε
Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ
ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν
καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου
εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας,
ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια.

in itself would you say that nobody but god would have this most precise knowledge?

Necessarily.

I wonder then, would it be possible for god to know things that are close to us when he has this separate knowledge in itself?

But why not?

Because, said Parmenides, we have agreed, Socrates, that neither do the separate *eide* have their properties relative to things close to us, nor the things close to us have their properties relative to the separate *eide*, but they each respectively have their properties relative to themselves.

We have agreed.

Then if this most precise lordship and this most precise knowledge is close to god, neither would that lordship ever dominate us nor would that knowledge know us or anything close to us, and similarly, we would not rule over them with our ruling power nor would we know anything at all of the divine by means of our knowledge; and moreover, by the same reasoning, they who are gods would not be lords over us nor would they know anything of human affairs.

But, he said, it would be a most astonishing argument that would deprive god of the power to know.

Such are the problems, Socrates, said Parmenides, and many others besides that necessarily accompany the **eide** if the *eide* are the *ideas* of beings themselves and if each *eidos* is demarcated as something separate in itself[16]; thus the listener would be perplexed and would doubt whether they exist, or if they do exist at all they would necessarily be unknown to human nature; and speaking in this way he would fancy he makes sense and, as I said, he would be utterly unconvinced. Only a very ingenious man will be able to perceive that for everything there is a genus and an essence in itself, and only an even more admirable man will find another one capable of adequately clarifying and teaching all these things.

I agree with you Parmenides, said Socrates, because you are saying what is very much in my mind.

And yet Socrates, said Parmenides, if someone pays attention to these and other similar objections and denies that the *eide* of beings exist and does not demarcate the *eidos* of each thing, he shall have nowhere to turn his thinking given that he does not allow the *idea*[17] of each being to be always the same – and in this way he annihilates the very capacity to reason. But I believe you have sensed something like

---

[16] The text explicitly cautions against (a) equating ideas with *eide* and (b) against considering *eide* as existing separately.

[17] Parmenides warns that if *eide* did not exist then *ideas* would not exist with which *dianoia* could work.

this.

You speak the truth, he said.

What are you going to do about philosophy then? Where shall you turn while these things are unknown?

I believe I don't see clearly at all, at least right now.

Because Socrates, he said, you tried too soon and before you had practiced, to define what is the beautiful and the just and the good and each one of the *eide*. I thought this when I heard you talking with Aristoteles here. The ardor with which you assault arguments is no doubt beautiful and godly. But while you are still young you must exert yourself and practice in that kind of subtle talk that the crowd considers and calls useless – otherwise the truth will escape you.

Parmenides proposes a method of investigation

Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;

Οὗτος, εἶπεν, ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν
e τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι.

Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.

Καὶ καλῶς γ᾽, ἔφη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον
136 σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.

Πῶς λέγεις; φάναι.

Οἷον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ
b αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ
c σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς

So then Parmenides, he said, what kind of practice is this?

The kind you heard from Zeno, he said, but also what you told him, and I admired you for it – not letting him limit the survey to visible things nor wander around them but instead focus on those things that one can best grasp by reason and can consider to be *eide*.

It seems to me, said Socrates, that in this way it is not difficult to show that things can be both like and unlike and can undergo any other condition whatsoever.

Fine then, said Parmenides, but this also must be done in addition if you want to be really trained: you must not only investigate what ensues from a hypothesis if each hypothesized thing is affirmed, but also if that very same thing is negated.

How do you mean? said Socrates.

For instance, answered Parmenides, take the hypothesis that Zeno proposed: if there are many, what must ensue for the many with respect to themselves and to *the one*, and also for *the one* with respect to itself and the many; and again if there are not many, consider what will ensue for *the one* and the many with respect to themselves and to each other. Again, if you assume whether likeness exists or not, what will ensue from each assumption for both the thing assumed and for *the others* with respect to themselves and each other alike; and likewise about the unlike and about motion and about rest and about generation and perishing and about being itself and not being. Simply put, about anything that you may suppose to be or not be and to undergo

αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές.

Ἀμήχανόν γ᾿ ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω. ἀλλά μοι τί οὐ διῆλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω;

d Πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῷδε.

Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διῆλθες ἡμῖν;

Καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι· αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ᾖ ὃ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ **e** τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην· ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καίτοι δοκῶ **137** μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ᾿ ἅρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι᾿ ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι· κἀγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων· ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὃ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν **b** δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ᾿ ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

Τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.

c Ἕτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.

any other condition, you must consider what ensues with respect to itself and likewise with respect to each, and to most and to all of *the others* that you may choose. Again, you must consider *the others* both with respect to themselves and to whatever you choose, whether you suppose it to be or not be – if, by practicing thoroughly, you are to discern the truth.

You propose a baffling task, Parmenides, he said, that I really don't grasp. Why don't you hypothesize a certain thing and go through it so I may learn better?

You demand too great a task of a man of my age, Socrates, he said.

You then, Zeno, said Socrates, why don't you go through it for us?

And Zeno laughed and said: Let's ask Parmenides himself, Socrates, because what he says is no easy matter; or don't you see what a heavy task you demand? If there were more of us it wouldn't even be worth asking because it would be unbecoming to discuss such matters before many people, given that he is so old, since the many do not know that without this comprehensive discourse and without this wandering off it is not possible to come upon and fasten the mind on the true. Therefore, Parmenides, I plead together with Socrates so that I myself may hear and learn over time.

Antiphon said that when Zeno finished talking Pythodorus recounted that he, Aristoteles and the others begged Parmenides to demonstrate what he meant and not refuse. And Parmenides said: I must comply although I feel that what is happening to me is the plight of Ibycus's horse – an old race horse that was about to enter the chariot race and trembled for what lay ahead because of past experience – to which Ibycus likened himself when he remarked that while he was likewise old in years he was forced against his will to make love. I think that I, too, am filled with great fear as I remember how I must cross such a vast sea of words while being so old. Nevertheless, I must do you the favor especially because, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves. Where shall we begin then, and what shall we hypothesize first? Or, since you expect to play this arduous game, do you wish to begin from myself and my hypothesis, hypothesizing about *the one*[18] itself, whether it exists or not and what must ensue?

Yes, by all means, said Zeno.

Who will answer my questions, then? he said. Will it be the youngest? He would be the least

---

[18] The discussion about *the one* that follows from this point on is about *eidos*, (*eidos = the one* as indicated in 132c6-7 above: «εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἕν εἶναι» = *"eidos is this very object of thought which is thought to be one"*). The bold italicized style – '*the one*' – is used to distinguish this substantive sense of the 'the one' from its ordinary numeral sense and in conformity with the corresponding bold italic style of '*the others*' ('the many').

First Hypothesis: what mere one (without being) implies
1 The one is not whole and has no parts

– Εἶεν δή, φάναι· εἰ ἕν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν;
– Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
– Οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.
– Τί δή;
– Τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν.
– Ναί.
– Τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὗ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ ὅλον ἂν εἴη;
– Πάνυ γε.
– Ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὂν καὶ μέρη ἔχον.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν.
– Ἀληθῆ.
d – Δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι.
– Δεῖ.
– Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἕξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν.
– Οὐ γάρ.

– So be it, he said: If it is [simply and purely] one, what else could the one be except not many?
– Of course.
– Therefore it must not have parts and it must not be whole.
– Why, exactly?
– The part is part of a whole.
– Yes.
– And the whole? Isn't whole that from which no part is missing?
– Indeed.
– Either way then the one would consist of parts, being whole and having parts.
– Necessarily.
– Either way it would be many and not one.
– True.
– And it must be not many but one.
– It must.
– Thus it will be not whole and have no parts if the one is to be one.
– No.

2 The one has no shape

– Οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἑκάστου.
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει.
– Ἄπειρον.
e – Καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει.
– Πῶς;
– Στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ.
– Ναί.
– Καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὗ ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾖ.
– Οὕτως.
– Οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

– If then it has no parts, it will have neither beginning nor end nor middle, since those kinds of things would be parts of it.
– Correct.
– And isn't beginning and end the boundary of each thing?
– Of course.
– Then *the one* is boundless if it has neither beginning nor end.
– Boundless.
– And thus shapeless, since it doesn't share either in the round or in the straight.
– How so?
– Round is that whose extremes are everywhere equidistant from the middle.
– Yes.
– And straight is that whose middle stands in the way of both extremes.
– So it is.
– Would not then *the one* have parts if it shared either in the straight or in the round shape?

| 138 | – Οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει.
– Ὀρθῶς. | – Yes indeed.
– Therefore it is neither straight nor round precisely because it has no parts.
– Correct. |

3 The one is nowhere

| | – Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.
– Πῶς δή;
– Ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὂν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἅπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἅπτεσθαι.
– Ἀδύνατον.
b – Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἔν τῳ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον.
– Ἀδύνατον γάρ.
– Οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν αὑτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.
– Οὐκ ἔστιν. | – Moreover, since it is like this it cannot be anywhere, because it is neither in anything else nor in itself.
– How so?
– If it were in anything else it would be contained all round by that in which it is, and would be touched by many things in many places; but it is impossible for **the one** to be touched all round in many places, because it has no parts and does not share in the round shape.
– Impossible.
– Furthermore, if it were in itself, it would be the container of none other than itself, if it really were to be in itself, for it is not possible to be in something that is not a container.
– Impossible.
– So then, the container would be one thing and the contained another, because one and the same thing cannot as a whole both contain and be contained; so **the one** would be two and would no longer be one.
– Indeed not.
– So, since it is not in itself or in another, **the one** is not anywhere.
– It is not. |

4 The one is not at rest and not in motion

| | – Ὅρα δή, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἑστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι.
– Τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ;
c – Ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.
– Ναί.
– Ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἓν ἔτι εἶναι.
– Ἀδύνατον.
– Οὐκ ἄρα κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται.
– Οὐ φαίνεται.
– Ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα τῷ φέρεσθαι;
– Ἴσως.
– Καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε | – This being the case let us see if it is possible for it to be at rest or to move.
– Why exactly should it not be?
– Because in moving it would be either transported or altered, since these are the only kinds of movements.
– Yes.
– And being altered from itself it would be impossible for **the one** to remain one.
– Impossible.
– Thus it does not move by alteration.
– It appears not.
– And by transport?
– Maybe.
– If **the one** were transported it would either be rotating in a circle or changing its place from another place.
– Necessarily.
– But in order to rotate it must stand still at the center while other parts of itself move around that center. But is there any device that could carry in a circle around a center something that has neither center nor parts? |

d μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι;

– Οὐδεμία.

– Ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;

– Εἴπερ γε δή.

– Οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη;

– Ναί.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον;

– Οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπη.

– Εἰ ἔν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ᾽ ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται;

– Ἀνάγκη.

e – Εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὗ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναί τινος μήτε ἔξω.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Οὗ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαί που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;

– Φαίνεται.

139 – Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ποι ἰὸν καὶ ἔν τῳ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὔτ᾽ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον.

– Οὐκ ἔοικε.

– Κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἓν ἀκίνητον.

– Ἀκίνητον.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί γέ φαμεν ἔν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον.

– Φαμὲν γάρ.

– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν.

– Τί δή;

– Ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν.

– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

– Ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἐν αὑτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

b –Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὂν οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ᾽ ἔστηκεν.

– Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε.

– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

– Οὔκουν δὴ φαίνεταί γε.

– None.

– Is it moved by changing places and *coming to be* in other places at other times?

– Yes, if it were to move to begin with.

– But it was shown that it cannot *be* in anything?

– Yes.

– Then *coming to be* is even more impossible.

– I don't understand how.

– If a thing is *coming to be* in something isn't it necessary that it *be* neither in nor entirely out of it while it is *coming to be*?

– It must.

– If there is anything that is affected this way it would only be the kind of thing that has parts, so that a part of it would be in and a part of it out simultaneously. But what has no parts cannot in its entirety be simultaneously in and out of something.

– True.

– That which has no parts and is not whole, is it not more impossible for it to *come to be* either in parts or as a whole?

– Apparently.

– Then it does not change place either by going and *coming to be* in something, or by rotating around itself or by being altered.

– No.

– So *the one* is unmoved with respect to all the kinds motion.

– Unmoved.

– But we also say that it is impossible for it to *be* in anything.

– We do.

– So it is never in *sameness*[19].

– Why, exactly?

– Because then it would be *in* that in which *sameness* is.

– Yes, of course.

– But it is not possible for it to be enclosed either in itself or in anything else.

– Not indeed.

– Thus the one is never in *sameness*.

– It seems not.

– But certainly then that which is never in *sameness* neither reposes at rest nor stands.

– It is not possible.

– *The one* then, as it seems, neither stands nor moves.

– Obviously not.

---

[19] «ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ» = "in the same"; with the definite article "the", the specific adjective "same" serves as its corresponding abstract generic substantive "sameness", denoting overall sameness of condition, place, status etc.

5 The one is neither other than nor the same as anything

– Οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε οὔτε ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἂν εἴη.

– Πῇ δή;

– Ἕτερον μέν που ἑαυτοῦ ὂν ἑνὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἕν.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑτέρῳ ὂν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δ᾽ **c** οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδ᾽ ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἕν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἑνός.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Ταὐτὸν μὲν ἄρα ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.

– Ὀρθῶς.

– Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἴει;

– Οὐ δῆτα.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὑτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον.

d – Ὀρθῶς.

– Οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται.

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὕτη δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ.

– Τί δή;

– Ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηταί τῷ τι, ἓν γίγνεται.

– Ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

– Τοῖς πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἂν ἓν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἕν, ταὐτόν.

e – Πάνυ γε.

– Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ταὐτὸν ἔσται, οὐχ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἓν ὂν οὐχ ἓν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἢ ἑτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν.

– Ἀδύνατον.

– Οὕτω δὴ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἓν οὔτ᾽ ἂν αὑτῷ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἑτέρῳ εἴη.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Moreover it will not be the same as another thing or as itself, nor would it be other than itself or than another.

– How so?

– If it were other than itself it would be other than *one* and it would not be *one*.

– True.

– Moreover, if it were the same as another it would be that other and not itself; thus it would not be what it is, *one*, but other than *one*.

– Of course not.

– So it is not the same as another or other than itself.

– No.

– It is not other than another while it is *one*; it is not a property of **the one** to be other than something; it is only the property of the *other* of some *other* and of nothing else.

– Correct.

– Therefore, being *one* would not cause it to be *other*, no?

– Of course not.

– But if this does not cause it to be *other*, then its own self does not cause it to be *other*, and if so, it is not *other*. And since it is in no way *other*, it will not be *other* than anything.

– Correct.

– Nor will it be the *same* as itself.

– Why not?

– Because the nature of **the one** itself is not the nature of the *same*.

– Why?

– Because when something becomes the *same* it does not become *one*.

– What then?

– If it becomes the *same* as many it must become many and not *one*.

– True.

– If **the one** and the *same* do not differ when something becomes *same* it would become *one* and when *one*, *same*.

– Indeed.

– If **the one** is the *same* with itself, it is not *one* with itself and so by being *one* it is not *one*, which is impossible; thus it is impossible for **the one** to be *other* than another or the *same* as itself.

– Impossible.

– Thus **the one** is neither other than nor the same as itself or another.

– Indeed not.

6 The one is neither like nor unlike anything

– Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιόν τινι ἔσται οὐδ᾿ ἀνόμοιον οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.
– Τί δή;
– Ὅτι τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.
– Ναί.
– Τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταὐτόν.

140 – Ἐφάνη γάρ.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.
– Ναί.
– Οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ.
– Οὐ φαίνεται.
– Οὐδὲ ὅμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ.
– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἕν.
– Πλείω γάρ.
– Τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου

b ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Τὸ δέ γε ἕν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἐστιν οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθ᾿ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν.
– Οὐ φαίνεται.

– Nor is it like something or unlike either itself or another.
– Why?
– Because the like in some way is affected by the same.
– Yes.
– And the nature of the same proved to be apart from the nature of **the one**.
– It did.
– But if **the one** is affected by something apart from **the one** it would be more than one, which is impossible.
– Yes.
– In no way then is **the one** affected to be the same as another or the same as itself.
– It seems not.
– Nor can it be like another or like itself.
– Not likely.
– Nor indeed can **the one** be affected to be other, because in that case it would be affected to be more than one.
– Yes, more.
– And indeed that which is affected to be other than itself or be other than another would be unlike itself or another if the like is affected by the same.
– Correct.
– And so **the one**, as it seems, because it is in no way affected by other is in no way unlike itself or another.
– No.
– So **the one** is neither like nor unlike either another or itself.
– It seems not.

7 The one is neither equal nor unequal to anything

– Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.
– Πῇ;
– Ἴσον μὲν ὂν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ.
– Ναί.

c – Μεῖζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω.
– Ναί.
– Οἷς δ᾿ ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται.
– Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
– Οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν;
– Ἀδύνατον.
– Ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ᾿ ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν

– This being the case, it is neither equal nor unequal either to itself or to anything else.
– How?
– As equal it would be of the same measures as its equal.
– Yes.
– Being larger or smaller than its commensurates it would have more measures than the lesser and fewer than the larger.
– Yes.
– And of the incommensurates, it would have lesser measures than some and larger than others.
– Of course.
– That then which does not share in the same cannot be of the same measures or of anything else the same?
– It cannot.
– Being without the same measures, it is not equal

– Οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὂν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὕτω αὖ οὐκέτι ἓν ἔσται ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.

d

– Ὀρθῶς.
– Εἰ δέ γε ἑνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι.
– Ἐφάνη γάρ.
– Οὔτε ἄρα ἑνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὔτε αὖ μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου.
– Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω.

8 The one is not older, newer or the same age as anything, nor in time, nor is time in it

e

– Τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἓν δοκεῖ τῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι;
– Τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ;
– Ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνί, οὔτε ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος.
– Ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν.
– Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

141

– Πῶς οὖν οἷόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῳ τοιοῦτον ὄν;
– Οὐδαμῶς.
– Οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερόν γε οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἓν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.
– Οὐ φαίνεται.
– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐάν τι ᾖ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν τό γε πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;
– Τί μήν;

b

– Τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνηται.
– Πῶς λέγεις;
– Ὧδε· διάφορον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ

either to itself or to anything else.
– It seems not.
– But by being of more or fewer measures, it would be of as many parts as it is of measures and thus it would no longer be one but it would be as many as the measures.
– Correct.
– And, moreover, if it is of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; it was shown, however, that it cannot be equal to itself.
– Yes, it was shown.
– Therefore, by not sharing either in one measure, or in many, or in a few, it seems it will never be equal to itself or to another; nor, again, will it be greater or lesser than itself or another.
– It is most certainly so.

– What then? Can *the one* be considered to be older or newer or of the same age?
– Why not?
– Because in being the same age as itself or another it would be sharing in temporal equality and likeness in which *the one* does not share, as we were just saying.
– We were saying indeed.
– And we were also saying that it does not share in unlikeness and inequality.
– We were indeed.
– How is it possible for something like this to be older than or newer than or be of the same age as anything?
– Not possible.
– Therefore *the one* is not newer nor yet older nor has the same age as either itself or anything else.
– Obviously not.
– So then *the one* could not be in time altogether if it is something like this. Or isn't it the case that if something is in time it must always become older than itself?
– It must.
– And the older is always older than the newer?
– Naturally.
– So the older it becomes than itself the newer it becomes at once if it is to obtain that than which it will become older.
– What do you mean?
– This: things already different from one another need nothing to *become* different, but either already *are* so, or *have been* or *will be* so, but what is *becoming* different neither *has been* nor *will be* nor *is* different, but is simply *becoming* and nothing else.
– This is necessarily so.
– And moreover, the older is a difference from the

<table>
<tr>
<td>

ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι.

c – Ἀνάγκη γὰρ δή.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

– Ἔστι γάρ.

– Τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι.

– Ἔοικεν.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτε ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.

– Ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα.

– Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ

d ἐστὶν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτήν τε αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε αὑτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι.

– Κινδυνεύει.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἑνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν.

– Οὐ γὰρ μετῆν.

– Οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἔν τινι χρόνῳ.

– Οὔκουν δή, ὥς γε ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.

</td>
<td>

newer and from nothing else.

– So it is.

– Therefore that which is coming to be older than itself it must also at once be coming to be newer than itself.

– It seems so.

– And further it must come to be neither in more time than itself nor in less but must *come to be* and must *be* and *have been* and in *future be* in equal time as itself.

– These also must be.

– It is necessary then, as it seems, that each of the things that are in time [**141d**] and share in time must be of the same age as itself, and newer than itself and older than itself all at once.

– It seems likely so.

– But none of these conditions belongs with **the one**.

– None does.

– Therefore neither time belongs with **the one** nor is **the one** in some time.

– No indeed, as the argument proves.

</td>
</tr>
</table>

9 Conclusion: The one neither is nor is it one

<table>
<tr>
<td>

– Τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος;

– Καὶ μάλα.

e –Τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα [τοῦ μέλλοντος];

– Ναί.

– Τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;

– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

– Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ᾽ ἐγίγνετο οὔτ᾽ ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ᾽ ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται.

– Ἀληθέστατα.

– Ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἄν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;

– Οὐκ ἔστιν.

– Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἓν οὐσίας μετέχει.

– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

– Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν.

– Οὐ φαίνεται. – Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.

– Κινδυνεύει.

142 – Ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἄν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ;

– Καὶ πῶς;

– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.

</td>
<td>

– So then. The '*was*' and the '*has become*' and the '*was becoming*' seem to indicate sharing in some past occurrence?

– Certainly.

– What then? Does not the '*will be*' and '*will become*' and '*will have become*' indicate a future thereafter?

– Yes.

– And the '*is*' and the '*is becoming*' indicate a present act?

– Yes indeed.

– If therefore the one does not in any way share in any time, it never '*has become*' nor '*was becoming*' nor '*was*', nor now '*became*' nor '*is becoming*' nor '*is*', nor '*shall become*' nor '*shall have become*' nor '*shall be*'.

– Most true.

– But is there a way other than these by which anything may share in being?

– There isn't.

– Then **the one** in no way shares in being.

– It seems not.

– So **the one** in no way *is*.

– Apparently not.

– Nor can it be *one*, because then it would *be* and share in *being*; but it seems that **the one** neither is *one* nor *is*, if you are to trust this argument.

– I'm afraid so.

– And of that which is not, could anything be in it or

</td>
</tr>
</table>

– Οὐ φαίνεται.
– Οὐδ᾽ ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.
– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
– Ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἓν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;
– Οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

of it while it is not?
– How could that possibly be?
– So it has no name, nor description nor knowledge nor sense nor opinion.
– It seems not.
– So it is not named nor spoken nor opined nor known nor does any being sense it.
– It seems not.
– Is it possible then for all these to be true about *the one*?
– It does not seem so to me.

Second Hypothesis: the one has substance

b – Βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ;
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.
– Οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτω;
– Ναί.
– Ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν;
– Οὐχ οἷόν τε.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ᾽
c ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἓν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτω;
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
– Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ἆρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἕν, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλλήβδην εἴπῃ ὅτι ἓν ἔστιν;
– Πάνυ γε.

– Are you willing then to revisit the hypothesis from the start in case our review shows us anything different?
– I am very much willing.
– We say then, if *the one is*, we must come to an agreement on the consequences of this whatever they be, no?
– Yes.
– Let's see now from the beginning: If *the one is*, is it possible for it to be and not to share in substance?
– Not possible.
– The *substance* of *the one* is not the same as *the one*; if it were the same it would not be the substance *of the one* nor would *the one* share in it, but saying '*one substance*' would be like saying '*one one*'. Now the hypothesis is not what must follow 'if *one one*', but 'if *it is one*', isn't it so?
– Yes, it certainly is.
– Because the '*is*' indicates something other than the '*one*'?
– It must.
– So when someone says generally that *the one* is, he means nothing else but that *the one* shares in substance?
– Indeed.

1 The one is a whole unlimited in multitude

d – Πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, τί συμβήσεται. σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὂν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν;
– Πῶς;
– Ὧδε· εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Πότερον οὖν ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον

– Let us then say again what would follow if *the one is*. Examine then if this hypothesis points to a *one* that is of such kind that must have parts.
– How?
– This way: If '*is*' is said about '*the one* that *is*' and '*one*' is said about '*the one* that is', and *substance* and *the one* are not the same but *of* the same thing, namely of the assumed '*the one* that *is*', must not '*the one* that *is*' be *one whole* and that 'one' and 'is' be portions of this *whole*?
– It must.
– What then, shall we refer to each of these portions

προσρητέον;
  – Τοῦ ὅλου.
  – Καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.
  – Πάνυ γε.
e   – Τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου;
  – Οὐκ ἂν εἴη.
  – Πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοιν τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὼ μορίω ἀεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἕν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ᾽ ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι.
143   – Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
  – Οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη;
  – Ἔοικεν.

as a mere portion, or as portion of the *whole*?
– Of the whole.
– ***The one*** that *is,* therefore, is whole as well as has portions.
– Of course.
– What then? Can each of two portions of ***the one*** *that is*, namely '*one'* and '*is'*, quit the other, either the '*one'* quitting the '*is'* or the '*is'* quitting the '*one'* portion?
– No, it cannot.
– Again then, each portion retains both '*one'* and '*is'* and each consists of at least two portions; and likewise any portion that comes to be always retains these two portions, for the '*one'* always retains the '*is'* and the '*is'* always retains the '*one'*. Thus, as it is always *coming to be* two it must never *be* one.
– Most certainly.
– In this way, would not ***the one*** *that is* be unlimited in multitude?
– It seems.

2 The one is unlimited in number

  – Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι.
  – Πῇ;
  – Οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἕν, διὸ ἔστιν;
  – Ναί.
  – Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἓν ὂν πολλὰ ἐφάνη.
  – Οὕτω.
  – Τί δέ; αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὗ φαμεν μετέχειν, ἆρά γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
  – Ἕν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
b –Ἴδωμεν δή· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.
  – Ἀνάγκη.
  – Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.
  – Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
  – Ὥστε οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον.
  – Πῶς γάρ;
c   – Τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν

– Let's continue this way.
– How?
– We say that ***the one*** shares in *substance* because it is?
– Yes.
– And because of this, ***the one*** was shown to be many.
– So.
– What then? If, for purposes of reasoning only[20], we isolate the *one* itself that we say shares in *substance*, and consider it by itself without that of which we say it shares, will it be shown to be only *one* or many?
– *One*, I think.
– Let's see: If the *one* is not *substance* but has a share in substance in its capacity as *one*[21], then the *substance* of the *one* must be *other* than it and the *one* itself *other* than the substance.
– It must.
–If *substance* is *other* and the *one* is *other*, then the *one* is *other* than *substance* not by virtue of *oneness*, and *substance* is other than the *one* not by virtue of *substance*, but both are other than each other by virtue of being different and *other*.
– Yes, by all means.

---

[20] «τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον» = "only according to reasoning" refers not to real distinctions which can only be grasped by νοῦς = mind, but only to conceptual distinctions made by διάνοια = reasoning, a faculty radically distinct from mind. See Introduction.

[21] This means that ***the one*** partakes of substance not insofar as it is simply one, but by virtue of being a certain kind of one thing, a *something* that stands out as a distinctive singularity, a 'one'.

οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἓν εἴτε
τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει
προαιρούμεθά τινε ὣ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι
ἀμφοτέρω;
– Πῶς;
– Ὧδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν;
– Ἔστιν.
– Καὶ αὖθις εἰπεῖν ἕν;
– Καὶ τοῦτο.
–Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἴρηται;
– Ναί.
– Τί δ᾽ ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἕν, ἆρα οὐκ
ἀμφοτέρω;
– Πάνυ γε.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ἕτερόν τε
καὶ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἄμφω λέγω;
– Ναί.
d –Ὧ δ᾽ ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἆρα οἷόν
τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτὼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή;
– Οὐχ οἷόν τε.
– Ὧ δ᾽ ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον
αὐτοῖν ἓν εἶναι;
– Οὐδεμία.
– Τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἕκαστα συμβαίνει
εἶναι, καὶ ἓν ἂν εἴη ἕκαστον.
– Φαίνεται.
– Εἰ δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς
ὁποιουοῦν ἡτινιοῦν συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ
πάντα;
– Ναί.
– Τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἄρτια;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
e – Τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ
τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δὶς ἓν
καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρὶς ἕν;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δὶς εἶναι;
καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τρία τρὶς εἶναι;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δὶς ὄντων καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν
καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δὶς εἶναι καὶ δύο
τρίς;
– Πολλή γε.
144 – Ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ
περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις.
– Ἔστιν οὕτω.
– Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἴει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν
ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι;
– Οὐδαμῶς γε.
– Εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἕν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ
πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς
πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται;
– Καὶ πάνυ γε.
– Οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ

– *Other* is not the same as *one* or *substance*.
– I don't see how it could be.
– Now then, if from these we make paired selections
either of *substance* and *other* or of *substance* and *one*
or of *one* and *other*, is it not correct to call the things
that we have selected in each of these pairs of choices
both?
– How?
– Like this: can we say *substance*?
– Yes.
– And again, can we say *one*?
– Yes again.
– And hasn't each of them now been said?
– Yes.
– So when I say *substance* and *one*, don't I say *both*?
– Indeed.
– Then if I say *substance* and *other* or *other* and *one*,
and so on, in each case I say *both*?
– Yes.
– And those that are correctly called *'both'*, is it
possible that they be *'both'* but not two?
– Not possible.
– And those that are two, is there a device by which
each of them would not be *one*?
– No.
– Since then each of these *ones* come in pairs, each
separately would be *one*.
– Evidently.
– And if each of them is *one*, when the *one* is
composed with any pair whatsoever, don't they all
become three?
– Yes.
– And three are odd and two are even?
– No doubt.
– If there are two, must there not be twice, and if
three thrice, since twice-one preexists in the two and
thrice-one in the three?
– There must.
– And if there are two and twice must there not be
twice-two, and if three and thrice must there not also
be thrice-three?
– No doubt.
– So then, if there are three and twice and two and
thrice, must there not be three-twice and two-thrice?
– Yes.
– So there would be *even times even* and *odd times
odd* and *odd times even* and *even times odd*.
– It is so.
– If this is so, do you think there is any number left
over which is not necessary to exist?
– No way.
– Therefore, if **the one** is, there must also be *number*.
– There must.
– If there is number there must be *many* and an
unlimited multitude of beings: or is it not the case
that number is unlimited in multitude and comes to

μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς;
– Ναί.

b – Ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ;
– Οὐδαμῶς.
– Κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἷόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας.
– Ἔχει οὕτω.

c – Πλεῖστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς.
– Πλεῖστα μέντοι.
– Τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος;
– Καὶ πῶς ἄν [τοι] τοῦτο γένοιτο;
– Ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεί, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ, ἕν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα [ἑκάστῳ] τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστιν τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.
– Οὕτω.
– Ἆρα οὖν ἓν ὂν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει.

d – Ἀλλ᾽ ἀθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.
– Μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον.
– Ναί.
– Καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ

e ἑνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ ἑνί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα.
– Παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται.
– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθός ἐστιν.
– Φαίνεται.
– Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὂν ἓν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
– Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

be by sharing in *substance*?
– Indeed.
– So if every number shares in *substance*, each fraction of number shares in *substance*?
– Yes.
– Therefore *substance* is distributed over all of the many beings and is not lacking in any of them, from the smallest to the greatest? Or is it irrational even to ask this? For how could *substance* be absent from beings?
– No way.
–So *substance* is dispersed in every way into beings that are as small and as large as possible, and is the most divided of all, and the parts of *substance* are unlimited.
– It is so.
– Therefore the parts of substance are the utmost.
– The utmost indeed.
– What then? Is there any one of them which is part of *substance* and yet not *one* part?
– How could this be?
– I suppose that if it *is* and so long as it is, it must be a *one* something, and it is impossible to be a nothing (not-even-one)[22]
– It must.
– So, **the one** is attached to each and every part of *substance* and is not absent either from the smallest or from the greatest or from any other part.
– Yes.
– Consider this: while it is *one,* is it in many places at once and as a *whole*?
– I am considering and I see it is impossible.
– If not as a *whole*, then as divided: in no other way can the *one* be present in all parts of *substance* unless it is divided.
– Yes.
– Also, what is divisible must be as many as there are parts.
– It must.
– So we did not speak the truth when we just said that *substance* is distributed in the greatest number of parts. It is not distributed to more than **the one** but to equally as many parts as **the one**: for neither is *being* absent from the *one* nor the *one* from *being*, but the two are always equal through all things.
– It certainly appears so.
– So **the one** itself fragmented by *substance* is a plurality and an unlimited multitude.
– Evidently.
– Therefore, not only is **the one** *that is* many, but the *one* itself distributed by that which *is* must necessarily *be* many.
– Most certainly.

---

[22] A pun: the word for 'nothing' is 'μηδέν' (μὴ δὲ ἕν) literally 'not-even-one'.

3 The one is whole and limited

– Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;

145

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη.

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν ἕν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει.

– Φαίνεται.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον;

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Τί δέ; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἂν του ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι;

– Οὐκ ἐθελήσει.

b

– Καὶ ἀρχὴν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν.

– Ἔχοι.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Also, since the portions are portions of a *whole*, **the one** is bounded by being a *whole*; or are not the portions enclosed by the *whole*?

– They must be.

– But that which encloses is limit.

– No doubt.

– So **the one** that *is* somehow is both one and many, whole and portions, and bounded and boundless in multitude.

– So it seems.

– Does it also have extremes, given that it is bounded?

– It must.

– Next, as a *whole*, would not **the one** have beginning and middle and end? Is it possible for something to be *whole* without these three? And if one of these is missing could it still be *whole*?

– It could not.

– So it seems that **the one** must have beginning and end and middle.

– It must.

– But the middle is equally distant from the extremes, or else it would not be middle.

– No.

4 The one has shape and is contained by something

– Καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἤ τινος μεικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

– Μετέχοι γὰρ ἄν.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ;

– Πῶς;

– Τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου.

– Οὕτω.

c

– Πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται;

– Ναί.

– Καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν ἐστιν;

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.

– Φαίνεται.

– Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν

– Being this kind of thing, it seems that **the one** would share in some sort of shape, either straight or round or a mixture of both.

– It would.

– This then being the case, would it not be in itself and in another?

– How so?

– Each part somehow is in the *whole* and none is outside the *whole*.

– Yes.

– And all the parts are contained by the *whole*?

– Yes.

– Indeed **the one** is all of its parts, and neither more nor less than all of them.

– No.

– And is not **the one** also the *whole*?

– No doubt.

– Since all the parts happen to be in the *whole*, and all the parts are **the one** as well as the *whole* itself, and all the parts are contained by the *whole*, **the one** would be contained by **the one**, and thus **the one** itself would be inside itself.

– It seems.

d ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί· ἔν τινι γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἔν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἔν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται;
– Οὐδαμῶς.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔν τισι τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἔν τισι τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον.
– Ἀδύνατον γάρ.
– Μὴ ὂν δ᾽ ἐν πλέοσιν μηδ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ μηδ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ

e μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι;
– Πάνυ γε.
– Ἧι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ᾗ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.
– Ἀνάγκη.

– But the *whole* is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any one in particular. If it were in all of them, it would also have to be in one; but because it is not in any one part, the *whole* cannot be in all of them; and if **the one** consists of all of them, but the *whole* is not in it, how can the whole be in all of them?
– No way.
– Nor is the *whole* in some of the parts, because if the *whole* were in some, the more would be in less, which is impossible.
– Impossible indeed.
– And by not being in several parts, or in one part, or in all the parts, must the *whole* either be inside another or be nowhere at all?
– It must.
– Being nowhere, it would be *nothing*, but given that it *is* whole and because it is not in itself, it must be in another?
– Indeed.
– Insofar as **the one** is *whole*, then, **the one** is in another; and insofar as it is all its parts, **the one** is in itself; and thus, **the one** must be both in itself and in another.
– It must.

5 The one is both in motion and at rest

146 – Οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι;
– Πῇ;
– Ἕστηκε μέν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ ἑνὶ ὂν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
– Ἔστι γάρ.
– Τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν ἑστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι.
– Πάνυ γε.
– Τί δέ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὂν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἑστάναι, μὴ ἑστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι;
– Οὕτως.
– Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἑστάναι.
– Φαίνεται.

– Being of such nature, must not **the one** move as well as be at rest?
– How?
– It is at rest, I imagine, if it is in itself; if it remains in **the one** without departing, it would be in *sameness*[23], namely in itself.
– That is so.
– And that which is always in *sameness* must always be at rest.
– Indeed.
– Next: That which is always in *otherness*[24] must, by contrast, never be in *sameness*, and by never being in *sameness* not be at rest, and by not being at rest be in motion.
– Yes.
– So **the one**, always in itself and in another, must be always in motion and at rest.
– It seems.

---

[23] See footnote #19 above.

[24] «ἐν ἑτέρῳ» = "in other"; the specific adjective "other" here serves as its corresponding abstract generic substantive noun, "otherness" and denotes overall otherness in every respect – otherness of place, condition or status. In contrast to "**the others**" = «τὰ ἄλλα» which means "other" in the sense of *aliud,* this "other" = «ἕτερον» means "other" in the sense of *alter.* See 148b5 below: "*other* («ἕτερον») somehow is *other* than something that is *like* it".

6 The one is the same as and other than itself and the others

– Καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον
b ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταὐτόν τε καὶ
ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν.
– Πῶς;
– Πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ
ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτόν ᾖ μηδ᾽ ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη
τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν
εἴη.
– Φαίνεται.
– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν;
– Οὐδαμῶς.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη,
πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν.
– Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε.
– Ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἑνὸς τὸ ἕν;
c – Οὐ δῆτα.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη.
– Οὐ μέντοι.
– Εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ
πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ
ἑαυτῷ;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Τί δέ; τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος
ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ
καὶ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται;
– Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
– Οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν
ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.
– Ἐφάνη γάρ.
– Ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν.
– Ἔοικεν.
d – Τί οὖν; εἴ τού τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος
ἕτερον ἔσται;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἕν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ᾽ ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός,
καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἕν;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων.
– Ἕτερον.
– Ὅρα δή: αὐτό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἆρ᾽ οὐκ
ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν
ταὐτῷ ποτε εἶναι;
– Οὐκ ἐθελήσει.
– Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν
ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα·
e εἰ γὰρ ὁντινοῦν εἴη ἔν τῳ, ἐκεῖνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν
ταὐτῷ εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως;
– Οὕτως.
– Ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἔν
τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕτερον.
– Ἀληθῆ.

– Further, *the one* must be the *same* as itself and *other* than itself, and also the *same* as **the others** and *other* than **the others** if the above arguments hold.
– How?
– Everything relates to all things in this way: It is either the *same* or *other*; or if it is neither the *same* nor *other*, it is related either as part to a whole or as whole to a part.
– It seems so.
– But is **the one** itself a part of itself?
– In no way.
– Then neither would it relate to itself as whole to part or as part to whole.
– It is not possible.
– But then is **the one** other than **the one**?
– Certainly not.
– Then it is not *other* than itself.
– Certainly not.
– If **the one** is neither *other* than itself, nor related to itself as whole to part or as part to whole, must it not be the same as itself?
– It must.
– What then? That which is [in a place, condition or state] *other* than itself while being in that same self must it not be *other* than itself – if indeed it is to be [in a place, condition or state] *other* than itself?
– I think so.
– But **the one** was shown to be such that it is at once in itself and in *other*.
– It was.
– So it seems that **the one** is *other* than itself.
– It does.
– And if a thing is *other* than something, it is *other* than that which is *other* than it?
– It must.
– So all the *non-ones* are *other* than **the one** and **the one** *other* than the *non-ones*.
– No doubt.
– So **the one** is *other* than **the others**.
– *Other*.
– See now: aren't the *same* itself and the *other* opposites of each other?
– How could they be otherwise?
– Would then the *same* ever be in the *other* or the *other* in the same?
– It would not.
– If then the *other* is never in the *same*, there are no beings in which the *other* would be present at any time; for if the *other* were in some being for any time, it would be in the *same* for just that time, not so?
– So.
– And because the *other* is never in the *same*, it is

147

– Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἓν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἕτερον.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἓν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου.
– Πῶς γάρ;
– Εἰ δὲ μήτε αὑτοῖς ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντη ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων;
– Ἐκφεύγοι.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλά πη ἂν ἓν ἦν.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετεῖχε τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μὴ ἕν;
– Μετεῖχεν.

b

– Εἰ ἄρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἕν, οὔτ᾽ ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἓν τὸ ἓν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων· οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.
– Ἔφαμεν γάρ.
– Φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἓν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἓν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς;
– Φῶμεν.
– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ.
– Κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου.

never in any being.
– True.
– So the *other* is neither in *non-ones* nor in **the one**.
– Indeed not.
– So it is not because of the *other* that **the one** is *other* than the *non-one* and the *non-one* than **the one.**
– No.
– Nor are they mutually *other* because of themselves, since they do not share in the *other*.
– I don't see how.
– If they are not *other* because of themselves and they are not other because of the *other,* does the case of their not being *other* elude us?
– It eludes us.
– Also, *non-ones* do not share in **the one,** otherwise they would not be *non-ones* but somehow be *one*.
– True.
– Nor are the *non-ones* number; for if they were they would not be fully *non-ones*.
– Indeed not.
– What then? Are *non-ones* portions of **the one**? Would not *non-ones* be sharing in **the one** if they were portions of the one?
– They would.
– Therefore, if **the one** is in every way *one* and if the *non-ones* are in every way *non-ones*, **the one** is not a portion of *non-ones* nor a whole with *non-ones* as portions; nor are *non-ones* portions of **the one** or wholes with **the one** as portion.
– Of course not.
– But we said that what are not portions nor wholes nor *other* with respect to each other are the *same* as each other.
– We did.
– Shall we say then that, this being the case with **the one** and the *non-ones*, **the one** is the same as they?
– Yes.
– Therefore, **the one**, it seems, is *other* than **the others** and other than itself and the same as they and itself.
– It seems clear from the discussion.

7 The one is like and unlike itself and the others

c

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;
– Ἴσως.
– Ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη.
– Τί μήν;
– Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον;
– Τί γὰρ ἄν;
– Εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως.
– Ναί.

– Is **the one** therefore both *like* and *unlike* itself as well as **the others**?
– Maybe.
– Because it was certainly shown to be *other* than **the others***, the others** also are somehow *other* than it.
– Of course.
– And it is *other* than **the others** exactly as much as **the others** are *other* than it and neither more so nor less?
– It must be so.
– If neither more nor less, then *like*.

<table>
<tr><td>

– Οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί.

d – Πῶς λέγεις;
– Ὧδε: ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς;
– Ἔγωγε.
– Τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ;
– Ἔγωγε.
– Πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί;
– Τί μήν;
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι;
– Πάνυ γε.

e –Ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗπερ ἦν ὄνομα.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν ἧσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
– ᾟ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ

148 ἑνός, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον· οὐχί;
– Ναί.
– ᾟ δὴ τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
– Ἔοικεν.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον.
– Ναί.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταὐτῷ.
– Καὶ τοῦτο.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἓν

b τοῖς ἄλλοις ταὐτόν.
– Ἐφάνη γάρ.
– Τοὐναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.
– Πάνυ γε.
– ᾟ γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη.
– Ναί.
– ᾟ ἄρα ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοὐναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὡμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον;
– Ναί.
– Ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταὐτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

c –Ἔοικεν.
– Ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ᾗ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ᾗ δὲ ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον.
– Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον.
– Καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.

</td><td>

– Yes.
– Just as it bears the condition of being *other* than ***the others*** in a way akin to their being *other* than it, likewise ***the one*** is the *same* as ***the others*** and ***the others*** are the same as ***the one***.
– How?
– Does each name you utter apply to some one thing?
– Yes.
– Even if you utter it more than once?
– Yes.
– So then, if you utter it only once you invoke that thing whose name it is, and if many times not that thing? Or, regardless of whether you utter the same name once or many times you must always invoke the same thing?
– Of course.
– And is not the *other* a name applied to something?
– Indeed.
– When you utter it, whether once or many times, you don't name any random thing but that thing whose name it is.
– I must.
– And when we say that ***the others*** are *other* than ***the one*** and ***the one*** is *other* than ***the others***, and have uttered the name *other* twice, no more do we speak of any other nature but of that one whose name it is.
– Indeed.
–Insofar as ***the one*** is *other* than ***the others*** and ***the others*** are *other* than ***the one***, and precisely by bearing the condition of *other,* ***the one*** bears the condition of being ***the same*** as ***the others*** and to bear the same condition is to be like, is it not?
– Yes.
– Insofar as ***the one*** bears the condition of being *other* than ***the others***, all things are *like* all things, because all things are *other* than all things.
– It seems so.
– Yes but the *like* is opposite to the *unlike*.
– Yes.
– And also the *other* is opposite to the *same*.
– This too.
– But it was also shown that ***the one*** is the *same* as ***the others***.
– Yes it was.
– And to be the *same* as ***the others*** is an opposite condition to being *other* than ***the others***.
– Indeed.
–And this while the *other* was shown to be the *same*.
– Yes.
– Accordingly, *the same* will be *unlike*, as a result of the fact that *unlike* is a condition opposite to the condition of being *like*. And the *other* somehow is *other* than something that is *like* it.
– Yes.
– So it is the *same* by way of being *unlike,* otherwise it would not be opposite to *other*.

</td></tr>
</table>

– Τίνα;
– ῏Ηι ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι· ᾗ δ᾽ ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὂν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι.
– Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
– Ταὐτόν τε ἄρα ὂν τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιόν τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.

d – Πάνυ γε.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται;
– Ἀνάγκη.

– It seems.
– So **the one** is *like* and *unlike* **the others**: while it is *other*, it is *like* and while it is the *same*, *unlike*.
– Yes, it seems to fit this account.
– And also the following.
– Which?
– While it bears the condition of the *same* it does not bear the *different* and by not bearing the *different* it is not *unlike*, and by not being *unlike* it is *like*; and while it bears the condition of the *other*, it is *different* and by being *different* it is *unlike*.
– True.
– Therefore, **the one** by being the *same* as **the others** and also by being the same as whatever is *other,* according to both of these accounts and according to either of them separately, it is both *like* and *unlike* **the others**.
– Indeed.
– With respect to itself also, because it was shown to be both *other* than and the *same* as itself, according to both of these accounts and according to either of them will it be shown to be both *like* and *unlike*?
– It must.

8 The one touches and does not touch itself and the others

– Τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι πέρι πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει.
– Σκοπῶ.
– Αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἓν ἐφάνη ὄν.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἕν;
– Ναί.

e – ῏Ηι μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτοιτο ἄν· ᾗ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἅπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ ἅπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν.
– Φαίνεται.
– Οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἅπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
– Ἅπτοιτο.
– Τί δὲ τῇδε; ἆρ᾽ οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὗ μέλλει ἅπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον ἣ ἂν μετ᾽ ἐκείνην ᾖ [ἕδρα] ᾗ ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἅψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν ᾗ αὐτό ἐστιν.
– Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

149 – Οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὂν τὸ ἓν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ᾽ ἂν ᾖ ἕν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει;
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἑνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὑτοῦ.

– What next? Let's see whether **the one** does or does not touch itself and **the others**.
–Let's do it.
– **The one** itself was shown to be in itself as a whole somehow.
– Correct.
– And **the one** is also in **the others**?
– Yes.
–Insofar as it is in **the others** it would be touching **the others**; and insofar as it is in itself it would refrain from touching **the others**; but, as it is in itself, it would be touching itself.
– It appears.
– Thus **the one** would be touching both itself and **the others**.
– It would.
– What about this? Must not everything that is to touch something else lie next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that particular position which, by being next to the position that the other thing occupies, touches it?
– It must.
– So if **the one** is to touch itself it must lie directly next to itself and occupy that place which is next to that other place in which **the one** itself is.
– It must indeed.
– But **the one** would accomplish these things if it were two and were in two places at once, but while

– Ἡ αὐτή.

– Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἅψεται.

– Τί δή;

– Ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαι χωρὶς ὂν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὗ μέλλει ἅψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἅψις εἶναι.

– Δεῖ.

– Ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὄροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς,

b αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο.

– Ναί.

– Καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ ἑνὸς προσγιγνομένου μία καὶ ἅψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ᾧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ· ἤδη γὰρ

c τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἕν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἅψις ταῖς ἄψεσιν.

– Ὀρθῶς.

– Ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀεὶ μιᾷ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Εἰ δέ γε ἓν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἅψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

– Πῶς γάρ;

– Οὔκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἑνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς.

– Πῶς γάρ;

– Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ἕν ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου

d ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν.

– Οὔ.

– τὸ ἓν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἕν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

– Οὐ φαίνεται.

– Ἅψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοιν.

– Οὐκ ἔστιν.

– Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ ἅψις οὐκ ἔστιν.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἅπτεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἅπτεται.

– Ἔοικεν.

it is *one*, it cannot.

– Indeed it cannot.

– It is by the same necessity that **the one** is not two that it does not touch itself.

– The same.

– But it will not touch **the others** either.

– Why, exactly?

– Because we said that that which is to touch, being apart, must be next to what is be to touched and there must be no third thing between them.

– True.

– There must be at least two if there is to be contact.

– There must.

– And if a third is attached to the two boundaries, there will be three and the contacts will be two.

– Yes.

– And likewise whenever one more is added one more contact is also added and as a result the contacts are always fewer by one than the number of the multitude. As the first two exceeded the contacts by being of greater number than the number of contacts, so also every subsequent number exceeds all the contacts by an equal excess, because every time *one* is subsequently added to the number at once one more contact is added to the contacts.

– Correct.

– So whatever the number of beings is, the contacts are one fewer than they.

– True.

– And if **the one** is alone and there is no dyad, there is no contact.

– Of course.

– We said that **the others** of **the one** neither are *one* nor share in **the one** if indeed they are *other*.

– No they do not.

– So there is no number in **the others** since there is no *one* in them.

– No doubt.

– So **the others** are neither *one* nor two nor are named by any other number.

– No.

– So **the one** alone is *one* and there is no dyad.

– It appears not.

– Because there are no two, there is no contact.

– No.

– So neither does **the one** touch **the others** nor **the others** touch **the one** because there is no contact.

– Indeed not.

– So for all these reasons, **the one** both touches and does not touch both itself and **the others**.

– It seems so.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;
– Πῶς;

e – Εἰ μεῖζον εἴη τὸ ἓν ἢ τἆλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἑκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἕν, σμικρότητα δὲ τἆλλα, ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη, μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμικρότης, ἔλαττον;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ τινε τούτω εἴδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω

150 τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην.
– Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
– Εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἤτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Τί δ᾽ εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δι᾽ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό;
– Δῆλον δή.
– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἑνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῳ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος,

b ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς;
– Ἀδύνατον.
– Ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἑνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.
– Ναί.
– Οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὰ ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐδενί ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτ᾽ ἐν μέρει μήτ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος.
– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ· μεῖζον γὰρ ἄν

c τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ᾖ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτὼ

– Is **the one** then *equal* and *unequal* to itself as well as to **the others**?
– How?
– If **the one** were more or less than **the others** or **the others** more or less than **the one**, would either **the one** or **the others** be either more or less than each other not by virtue of **the one** being *one* nor **the others** by virtue of being other than *one*, i.e., not by virtue of their respective essence? But, instead, if each had equality in addition to being what each is, they would be equal to each other; and if **the others** had largeness and **the one** smallness or **the one** largeness and **the others** smallness, whichever of the two that belonged to the **eidos** of largeness would be more and that which belonged to smallness, would be less?
– It must be.
– Don't these two **eide** – largeness and smallness – exist? If they did not exist they would not come to be each other's opposites nor come to be in things.
– Of course.
– If smallness comes to be in **the one**, it would be either in the whole *one* or in part of it.
– It must.
– If in the whole, would it not be either equally stretched throughout the whole *one* or contain it?
– Obviously.
– So if the smallness were spread equally throughout **the one** it would be equal to it, and if smallness were to contain **the one**, smallness would be greater?
– No doubt.
– Is it possible for smallness to be equal or greater than something and to accomplish what is proper to largeness and equality but not what is proper to it?
– Not possible.
– So smallness cannot be in the whole *one* but in part, if at all.
– Yes.
– And not in all of the part either, or else it would proceed as it did in relation to the whole, and be equal to or greater than the part in which it is.
– It must.
– So smallness never *is* in anything, nor does it come to be either in a part or in the whole; nor is there anything small except smallness itself.
– It seems not.
– Nor is largeness contained in **the one**, because then something other than largeness would be larger – namely that in which largeness was contained – while smallness, which largeness must exceed if it is to be large, was not in that container; and this is impossible because smallness is nowhere.
– True.

d τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλω, οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἓν τούτοιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζον ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.
– Οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε.
– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὂν ἴσον εἶναι.
e – Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
– Καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι· μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ᾽ ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ᾽ ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου ὂν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη.
– Φαίνεται.
– Καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη
151 ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μεῖζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν.
– Εἴη γὰρ ἄν.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων;
– Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὂν ἀεί.
– Ναί.
– Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὂν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἔν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς
b ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι;
– Φαίνεται.
– Ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττω.
– Ἔοικεν.
– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
– Φαίνεται.
– Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν
c εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν.
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὂν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἔλαττον ἂν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὑτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσον αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταὐτά.
– Πῶς;
– Ὧνπερ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν

– But largeness itself is larger than nothing else except smallness and smallness is not smaller than anything else except largeness itself.
– Indeed not.
– Nor are *the others* larger or smaller than *the one*, because they do not have either largeness or smallness, and because these two (i.e., largeness and smallness) do not have the power to exceed or be exceeded by *the one* but only by each other; nor, again, can *the one* be larger or smaller either than these two (i.e., largeness and smallness) or than *the others*, since it has neither largeness nor smallness.
– Indeed, it appears not.
– So then, if *the one* is neither larger nor smaller than *the others*, must it neither exceed nor be exceeded by them?
– It must.
– That which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must it not then be even and, by being even, be equal?
– Of course.
– And further, *the one* itself must relate to itself similarly: having neither largeness nor smallness in itself, it neither exceeds nor is exceeded by itself but, by being even, is equal to itself.
– Yes, by all means.
– Therefore *the one* is equal to itself and to *the others*.
– So it appears.
– Moreover, by being in itself *the one* contains itself from the outside and, as container, it is larger than itself while, as contained, it is smaller, and in this way *the one* is both larger and smaller than itself.
– Yes it is.
– Is it not also true that nothing *is* except *the one* and *the others*?
– Of course.
– But what *is* must always be somewhere.
– Yes.
– Anything that is *in* something is a smaller thing in a larger thing; there is no other way for one thing to be in another.
– No.
– And since there is nothing else apart from *the one* and *the others*, and these must be in something, must they not be in each other, *the others* in *the one* and *the one* in *the others*, or else be nowhere?
– It appears so.
– So because *the one* is in *the others*, *the others* would be larger than *the one* because they contain it and *the one* would be smaller than *the others* because it is contained; and because *the others* are in *the one*, for the same reason *the one* would be larger than *the others* and *the others* smaller than *the one*.
– It seems.
– So *the one* is equal to, larger and smaller than both itself and *the others*.

εἴη αὐτῶν, ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταὐτά.
– Οὕτως.
– Οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὂν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὂν αὑτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὑτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὑτοῦ.
– Φαίνεται.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα ὡσαύτως ἕξει τὸ ἕν; ὅτι μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν: ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
– Ἔσται.

– It appears.
– And if larger and smaller and equal, it would be of equal, larger and smaller measures with itself and *the others*; and if of measures, also of parts.
– Of course.
– So being of equal and larger and smaller measures it would also be smaller and larger in number than itself and *the others* and equal to itself and *the others*.
– How?
– Compared to those things than which *the one* is larger, it would have more measures than they have and it would also have as many parts as it has measures; and likewise with respect to the things that are smaller than and equal to *the one*.
– So.
– And by being larger and smaller than itself and equal to itself, *the one* would be of an equal number of measures and of more and of fewer measures than itself, and if this be the case with respect to measures it is also the case with respect to parts.
– Of course.
– So by being of equal parts as itself *the one* would be the same in multitude as itself, in being of more parts it would exceed itself in number and in being of fewer parts it would be lesser than itself in number.
– It appears.
– Will not *the one* be similarly disposed toward *the others*? When it appears to be larger than they, must it not exceed them in number; when it appears smaller be of lesser number; and when equal in largeness also be equal to *the others* in multitude?
– It must.
– So, as it seems, *the one* is equal in number to, and more than, and less than itself and *the others*.
– It is.

10 The one is older and newer than and the same age as itself and the others

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον;
– Πῶς;
– Εἶναι μέν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἓν ἔστιν.
– Ναί.
– Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία;
– Ἔστι γάρ.
– Μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.
– Πάνυ γε.
– Οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου;

– Does *the one share in time* and, by sharing in time, both *is* and *is coming to be* both newer and older than both itself and *the others* and neither younger nor older than either itself or *the others*?
– How?
– If *the one is*, then '*to be*' somehow subsists in it.
– Yes.
– And '*to be*' is nothing other than the sharing in substance together with the present time, just as '*was*' and '*will be*' are the communion of substance with past time and with future time.
– It is indeed.
– Therefore, it shares in time if it shares in '*to be*'.
– Indeed.
– And, therefore, in time as it marches on?
– Yes.

– Ναί.

– Ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;

– Μεμνήμεθα.

– Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἕν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον

b γίγνοιτο;

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὑτοῦ οὕτω.

– Ναί.

– Ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ᾖ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι

c πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τότ᾽ ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προϊὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προϊὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ᾽ ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ

d γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ τοῦτο ᾖ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον.

– Φαίνεται.

– Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον.

– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

– Οὐκοῦν οὗπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν· ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὑτοῦ;

– Ναί.

– Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;

– Ἔστιν.

– Καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὑτοῦ ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν.

– Ἀνάγκη.

e – Τό γε μὴν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾖ.

– Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

– Ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἕν.

– Ἔοικεν.

– Πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον;

– Τὸν ἴσον.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– So *the one* always becomes older than itself if it advances according to time.

– It must.

– But do we remember that, by coming to be newly, the older becomes older?

– We remember.

– And so, because *the one* comes to be older than itself, does it not come to be older than itself by coming to be newer than itself?

– It must.

– And in this way it comes to be both newer and older than itself.

– Yes.

– And is it older when, in coming to be so in the *now*, it is between the '*was*' and the '*will be*'? Because it will not somehow bypass the *now* when it proceeds from the *before* to the *after*.

– Indeed not.

– Does it not, therefore, refrain from coming to be older whenever it encounters the *now,* but instead of then coming to be older, it already is older? As long as it is in process it cannot be captured by the *now*, because what is in process is such that it touches both the *now* and the *after;* the *now* while it is leaving it and the *after* while reaching it, coming to be between both of them, both the *after* and the *now*.

– True.

– And if all coming to be must not bypass the *now,* whenever *the one* encounters the *now* it always refrains from *coming to be* and then already *is* whatever it was *coming to be*.

– It appears.

– And so when *the one* encounters the *now* while coming to be older, it abstains from *coming to be* and then *is* older.

– Yes, indeed.

– And now *the one* is older than that thing than which it was coming to be older; but is not *the one* itself that very thing than which it was coming to be older?

– Yes.

– And that which is older is older than that which is newer?

– It is.

– Therefore also when *the one* happens to be *coming to be* older in the *now*, right then it *is* newer than itself.

– It must.

– Moreover, the *now* always is in attendance in *the one* through every aspect of 'to be'; because whenever *the one is*, it is always *now*.

– Of course.

– Thus *the one* always both *is* and *comes to be* older and newer than itself.

– It seems.

–When *the one is* or *is coming to be* older or newer

– Τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον
οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ
γιγνόμενον καὶ ὂν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον
ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν οὐδὲ γίγνεται.

– Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

– Τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων;

– Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

153 – Τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός,
εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός·
ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὂν ἓν ἂν ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός
ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι.

– Ἔχοι γὰρ ἄν.

– Πλῆθος δὲ ὂν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ
ἑνός.

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ
γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω;

b – Τὰ ἐλάττω.

– Τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ἕν. ἢ
γάρ;

– Ναί.

– Πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἓν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν
ἐχόντων· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ
ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν.

– Ἔχει γάρ.

– Πρῶτον δέ γε οἶμαι γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλα ὕστερον, τὰ δ᾽ ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ
πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τἆλλα
νεώτερα τοῦ ἑνός, τὸ δὲ ἓν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

– Εἴη γὰρ ἄν.

c – Τί δὲ τόδε; ἆρ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν
αὑτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

– Ἀδύνατον.

– Ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἕν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ
ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.

– Ναί.

– Οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ
τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν
καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;

– Τί μήν;

– Καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι πάντα τἆλλα
τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ
γεγονέναι ἕν τε καὶ ὅλον.

– Φήσομεν γάρ.

d – Τελευτὴ δέ γε οἶμαι ὕστατον γίγνεται, τούτῳ δ᾽
ἅμα τὸ ἓν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ
τὸ ἓν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν
γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη
γίγνεσθαι.

– Φαίνεται.

– Νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἓν ἐστι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα
τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα.

– Οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται.

– Τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ

than itself does it do so in more time or in equal
time?

– Equal.

– But in being, or in coming to be for equal time, it
has the same age.

– Of course.

– And what has the same age is neither older nor
newer.

– Indeed not.

– So *the one*, while being and coming to be in equal
time as itself, neither is nor is coming to be either
newer, or older than itself.

– It seems not.

– Than *the others* also, then?

– I am not in a position to say.

– But you do say this: that *the others*, if they are
plural and not a singular *other*, are more than one;
because if *the others* were a singular *other* they
would be one; but being plural *others* *the others* are
more than one and have multitude.

– Of course they have.

– Multitudes share in number greater than one.

– No doubt.

– Do we say that the greater number emerges and
comes to pass earlier or that the smaller does?

– The smaller.

– So the smallest is first, which is *the one*, no?

–Yes.

– So of all things that have number, *the one* is first;
and all *the others* have number if they are plural and
not singular other.

– They do indeed.

– And I think that as *the one* emerged first, it
emerged earlier, and *the others* emerged later, and
they that emerged later are newer than those that
came earlier; so *the others* are newer than *the one*
and *the one* is older than *the others*.

– Of course they are.

– And what of this? Could *the one* turn out to be
contrary to its own nature, or is this impossible?

– Impossible.

– But *the one* was shown to have parts and, if parts,
also beginning, end and middle.

– Yes.

– And the beginning of all things – both of *the one*
itself and of each of *the others* – is the first that
comes to be, and after it come all *the others* through
to the end?

– Of course.

– And we say that *the others* are all portions of the
whole and of *the one*, and that *the one* comes to be
one and *whole* together with the end.

–We do.

– The end, I think, comes to be last and *the one*
comes to be together with it according to its nature.
So that if *the one* is not to turn out to be contrary to

ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖον ἓν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;
– Ἀνάγκη.

e – Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ᾽
ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν
ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῳοῦν,
ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἓν γένηται,
οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου
οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ
ἕν· ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε

154 πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη,
ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἓν τῶν
ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ
τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε
καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
– Ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ
περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ
νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ μήτε
νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἆρα ὥσπερ
περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ

b ἑτέρως;
– Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
– Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε· εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον
ἕτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ
ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ
οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὂν ἔτι
νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα,
χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ
ὅσῳπερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ.

c – Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
– Οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὂν τοῦ [ἑνὸς] ὄντος γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν ποτε
πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ
τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ
νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ᾽ οὔ.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε
πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται.
– Πῇ δή;
– Ἧι τό τε ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ
τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός.
– Τί οὖν;

d – Ὅταν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ᾖ, πλείω που
χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα.
– Ναί.
– Πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ
προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἆρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ
διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ;
– Σμικροτέρῳ.
– Οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τἆλλα
ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον τὸ ἕν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ
ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλαττον ἀεὶ τῇ

its nature, it will, according to its nature, come to be
last, together with the end.
– So it appears.
– Therefore *the one* is newer than *the others* and *the others* older than *the one*.
– So it appears to me also.
– What then? The beginning or any other part of *the one* or of any other thing, while it is a part, must it not be a *one* if it is to be a singular part and not plural parts?
– It must.
– And *the one* comes to be at once as the first part does, and as the second and so on, omitting none of *the others* that come to be in succession of one another, until, having gone through to the last, *the one* comes to be a whole one without, in this process of coming to be, skipping either the middle or the first or the last or any other part.
– True.
– Therefore *the one* is of the same age as all *the others*. So if *the one* is not contrary to nature, it does not come to be either before or after *the others* but simultaneously with them. And according to this argument *the one* is neither older nor newer than *the others*, nor are *the others* older or newer than it, but according to the previous argument *the one* is both older and newer, and *the others* of *the one* are likewise.
– Yes indeed.
– It *is* and *has come to be* in this way, but what about its *coming to be* older and newer than *the others* and *the others* than it, and its coming to be neither younger nor older? Is the case of its *coming to be* similar to the case of its *being*, or is it different?
– I cannot say.
– But I can say this much: if one thing is older than another it cannot come to be still older than the original age difference by which it came to be at first, nor being newer to come to be newer still, because the addition of equals to unequals, whether in the case of time or of anything else, always results in the difference being equal to what it was at first.
– Of course.
– So, that which *is* cannot *come to be* older or newer than that which already *is*, if its age difference is always equal, but it *is* and *has come to be* older and the other has *come to be* newer, but it is not *coming to be*.
– True.
– So *the one* that *is* older or newer never *comes to be* older or newer than *the others*.
– Indeed not.
– Let's see if in this way it becomes older or younger.
– In what way, exactly?
– In that way by which *the one* appeared older than *the others* and *the others* than *the one*.

ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον· ἢ οὔ;

e – Ναί.

– Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρός τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;

– Νεώτερον.

– Εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἓν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον;

– Πάνυ γε.

– Τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν

155 γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ᾽ αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἵω τε εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλ᾽ εἶεν ἄν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἓν τῶν

b ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὂν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα.

– Φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

– Οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τἆλλα

c τοῦ ἑνός· ᾗ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτῃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων;

– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

– Κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.

– Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

d – Ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει;

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.

– Τί μήν;

– Καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.

– Πάνυ γε.

– Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα

– What then?

– When *the one* is older than *the others,* it has been for more time than *the others*.

– Yes.

– Again, consider: if we add equal time to more and to less time, will the more differ from the less by equal fraction or by smaller?

– By smaller.

– So the age difference between *the one* and *the others*, whatever it was at first, will not remain the same afterward, but *the one* by taking equal time as *the others*, will differ in age from *the others* by less than before, no?

– Yes.

– And does that which differs in age from something by less than before, become newer than those in relation to which it was previously older?

– Newer.

– And if that is newer, are not *the others* correspondingly older than *the one* than they were before?

– Indeed.

– So what has been newer *is becoming* older with respect to that which previously *had been* and now *is* older, and it never *is* older but always *is becoming* older than that. For the one is tending toward being newer and the other older. And again, the older becomes newer than the newer in similar fashion. For as they move in opposite direction they *are coming to be* their mutual opposites, the newer coming to be older than the older and the older coming to be newer than the newer. But they cannot *have come to be*. For if they *had come to be*, they would not be *coming to be* but would actually *be*. In the now they *are coming to be* each other's older and newer. *The one* is coming to be newer than *the others* because it was shown to *be and have been* prior, and *the others are coming to be* older than *the one* because they were shown to *have been* last. According to the same argument the same holds for *the others* relative to *the one*, since they were shown to *be* and *have been* older than it.

– So it appears.

– Since neither of the two comes to be either older or newer than the other because they differ from each other by an *equal number*, neither does *the one* come to be older or newer than *the others,* nor do *the others* come to be older or newer than *the one*. And moreover, given that those that came to be earlier than the later as well as those that came to be later than the earlier, necessarily differ by a *different portion*, it follows that both *the others* and *the one* must be both older and newer than each other.

– Indeed.

– According to all these arguments then, *the one* is and is coming to be both older and newer than itself

ταῦτα πράττομεν.
– Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

e – Καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ,
καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ
ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν
ἔστιν.
– Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.

and *the others*.
– Absolutely.
– And since *the one* shares in time and also shares in coming to be both older and newer, must it not therefore share in the '*before'* and the '*after'* and the '*now'*, if it shares in time?
– It must.
– Then *the one is* and *will be* and *was coming to be* and *is coming to be* and *will come to be*.
– Of course.
– And there *would be*, and *was* and *is* and *will be* something that is in it and belongs to it.
– Indeed.
– And there would be knowledge of it, and opinion and sensation, since indeed we are right now performing all these things with respect to it.
– Correct.
– And it has name and description and it is named and described. And whatever other similar properties pertain to *the others* pertain also to *the one*.
– This is absolutely so.

11 From-the-sudden: Being-becoming and nonbeing-perishing in time

– Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον
διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἔν τε ὂν καὶ
πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου,
ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ
ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ
μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν;
– Οὐχ οἷόν τε.
– Ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ
μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ
οὐ μετέχοι.

156 –Ὀρθῶς.
– Οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει
τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε
ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή
ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ;
– Οὐδαμῶς.
– Τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἆρά γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι
καλεῖς;
– Ἔγωγε.
– Τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἆρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι;
– Καὶ πάνυ γε.
– Τὸ ἓν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιὲν οὐσίαν

b γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὂν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ
ἀπολλύμενον ἆρ᾽ οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἕν, τὸ πολλὰ
εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἓν εἶναι
ἀπόλλυται;

– Let us then discuss a third thing: If *the one* is such as we have detailed, being both one and many and neither one nor many and sharing in time, must it not sometimes share in substance because it is one and sometimes not share in substance because it is not one?
– It must.
– Is it then possible to share in substance while it is not sharing in it or not to share while it is sharing?
– Not possible.
– So it shares in substance at one time and does not at another time, for only this way can it share and not share in the same thing.
– Correct.
– And is there not a time when it is partaking of substance and when it is being relieved of it? Or how can it sometimes be and have substance, and sometimes not have it, if it is not at some time taking it and at another time letting go of it?
– No way.
– Do you call the partaking of substance coming to be?
– I do.
– And do you call the letting go of substance perishing?
– Indeed, by all means.
– So then, it seems that *the one*, by partaking and letting go of substance, comes to be and perishes.
– It must.
– And as it *is* one and many and it *comes to be* and

– Πάνυ γε.

– Ἕν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαί τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι;

– Πολλή γε.

– Καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαί τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι;

– Ναί.

– Καὶ ὅταν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαί τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι;

– Οὕτως.

c – Ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ ὅταν ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δήπου αὐτό γε μηδ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι.

– Πῶς δή;

– Ἑστός τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν.

– Πῶς γάρ;

– Χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

– Οὐκ εἰκός.

– Πότ᾽ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε

d κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει;

– Τὸ ποῖον δή;

– Τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται

e μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

– Κινδυνεύει.

– Καὶ τὸ ἓν δή, εἴπερ ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα – μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ – μεταβάλλον δ᾽ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ᾽ ἂν τότε, οὐδ᾽ ἂν σταίη.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει,

157 ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται;

– Ἔοικε γοῦν.

---

perishes, are the many not perishing when it comes to be one, and is **the one** not perishing when it comes to be many?

– Indeed.

– And in coming to be one and many, must it not undergo segregation and also aggregation?

– It must indeed.

– And when it comes to be like and unlike, must undergo assimilation and differentiation?

– Yes.

– And when larger and smaller and equal, must increase, decrease and be equal?

– Yes.

– And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when from rest it changes to motion, it must somehow be in no time at all.

– How exactly?

– It is impossible for **the one** to be previously at rest and afterward in motion and previously in motion and afterward at rest without changing.

– Of course not.

– Because there is no time in which something would be neither in motion nor at rest.

– No, of course not.

– But neither would it be altering without being altered.

– Not possible.

– But when would it be altered? It is not altered while at rest, nor while in motion, nor while it is in time.

– No, of course not.

– Thus there is this paradoxical thing in which it is when it changes.

– What thing?

– The *from-the-sudden*[25], because the *from-the-sudden* seems to indicate a certain kind of thing from which each condition changes to its corresponding other condition. For it does not change from rest while at rest nor from motion while in motion, but the nature of the *from-the-sudden* is something paradoxical that lies between both motion and rest and is in no time at all, and it is *to* this and *from* this that the condition of motion changes to rest and the resting condition changes to motion.

– Possibly.

– So then, **the one**, whether at rest or in motion, alternates between these two states (for it is only in this way it can accomplish either), and as it alternates, it alternates *from-the-sudden*, and while it alternates it is not in any kind of time whatsoever, and is neither in motion nor at rest.

– Indeed not.

---

[25] The conventional translation of Plato's ἐξαίφνης *(exaíphnes)* as "instant" can be wrong, because "instant", originally an adjective, can ambiguously refer to "instant of time". Plato's text makes it unambiguously clear that his *exaíphnes* is not a part of time. Hence it is here translated literally as *from-the-sudden*.

– Κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ᾽ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε

b ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν.
– Οὐκ ἔοικε.
– Ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ᾽ ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἕν, εἰ ἔστιν.
–Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Is this also not the case with the other changes, when it changes from being to perishing or from not being to coming to be – is it then between certain kinds of motions and rests, and neither is nor is not, neither coming to be nor perishing?
– It seems so.
– And according to this argument, in going from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither segregates nor aggregates; and in going from like to unlike and from unlike to like it does not either assimilate or differentiate; and in going from small to large and to equal and to their contraries – [namely that which is] neither small nor large nor equal – it would not be increased, nor decreased nor equated.
– It seems not.
– If **the one** is, it would undergo all these conditions.
– Of course.

<h1 style="text-align:center;color:#2E74B5">Third Hypothesis: the others if the one is</h1>
<h2 style="text-align:center;color:#2E74B5">1 The others are whole that have portions of the one</h2>

– Τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οὐ σκεπτέον;
– Σκεπτέον.
– Λέγωμεν δή, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι:
– Λέγωμεν.
– Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν

c ἐστι τἆλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πη.
– Πῇ δή;
– Ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾖ.
– Φαμὲν γάρ.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου.
– Πῶς τοῦτο;

d – Εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήπου μόριον ἔσται, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων. ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὂν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνὸς ἑκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὂν δὲ μόριον ἑκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὂν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ἀδύνατον [εἶναι].

– Now, shall we consider what should happen with respect to **the others** if **the one** is?
– Let's consider.
– We say then, if **the one** is, what must happen to **the others** of **the one**?
– We say.
– Because they are other than **the one**, **the others** are not *one;* if they were they would not be other.
– Right.
– Nor are **the others** totally devoid of **the one** but in a way they share in it.
– How, exactly?
– It is through having portions of **the one** that **the others** are other, for if they did not have portions of the one they would be entirely *one*.
– Correct.
– Portions, we said, are of that which is *whole*.
– Yes.
– But the whole must be a *one* made out of many, the portions being portions of that whole, for every portion must be a portion not of many but of a whole.
– How?
– If something is a portion of many, with itself being one of them, it would doubtless be a portion of itself[26], which is impossible, and of each one and of all **the others**. But because it is not a portion of *one*, it will be a portion of **the others** minus the one, and thus it will not be a portion of each *one;* and not being a portion of each *one*, it will be of none of the

---

[26] It would be a portion of itself because that which is a portion of **the one** is also one of **the others**, the πολλὰ, the many, ("**the others** are the many" – τἆλλα τὰ πολλά of Socrates's initial definition in 129a3)

– Φαίνεταί γε δή.

– Οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἑνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἴη.

– Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

– Εἰ ἄρα τἆλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς μετέχοι.

– Πάνυ γε.

– Ἓν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός.

– Ἀνάγκη.

158 – Καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἑκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἓν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται.

– Ὀρθῶς.

– Μετέχοι δέ γε ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὂν ἢ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἕν. νῦν δὲ ἑνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀδύνατόν που.

– Ἀδύνατον.

– Μετέχειν δέ γε τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ὅλον ἔσται, οὗ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἕκαστον ἓν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόριον ὅλου.

– Οὕτως.

many. Something that belongs to none of all these cannot be a portion or anything else of that to which it is nothing.

– So it appears.

– So the portion is not a portion of many or of all but of a certain one idea, and of a certain one thing that we call whole, that has come to be a complete one consisting of all; it is of this that a portion would be a portion.

– Most certainly.

– If then *the others* have portions, they would also share in the whole and in *the one*.

– Of course.

– Therefore, those that are *the others* of *the one* must be one perfect whole that has portions.

– They must.

– And the same argument holds for each of the portions, for each must also share in *the one*. For since each of them is a portion, and "each" in a way means "one*,"* each is by itself and set apart from *the others* if it is to be "each".

– Correct.

– Each of them shares in *the one* because it is other than one, or else it would not be sharing but would be *the one* itself. But it is impossible for anything to be *one* but *the one* itself.

– Impossible.

– And both the whole and the portion must share in *the one*. *The one* is whole because the portions are its portions; and again, each *one* portion is a portion of the whole if it belongs to a whole.

– Just so.

2 The others are limited and unlimited

b – Οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ;

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Τὰ δ᾽ ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἑνός ἐστι τά τε τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἑνός;

– Πῶς;

– Ὧδε ἴδωμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἓν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑνὸς τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει;

– Δῆλα δή.

– Οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἔνι;

– Πλήθη μέντοι.

c – Τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη

– And the things that share in it, don't they share in it insofar as they are other than *the one*?

– Of course.

– But things other than *the one* are many, for if *the others* are neither one nor more, they would be nothing.

– Nothing indeed.

– And since both those that share in the one portion and in *the one* as a whole are more than one, must not those that partake of *the one* be themselves unlimited in multitude?

– How?

– Look at it this way: when they are in the process of *partaking of the one*, are they not *partaking* simply because they neither *are* the one nor *share in* the one?

– Obviously.

– Because they are multitudes then, in which there is no *one?*

καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἕν;

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει;

– Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

d – Καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἓν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια.

– Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

– Τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἡ δ᾽ ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.

– Φαίνεται.

– Οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.

– Πάνυ γε.

– Because they are multitudes.

– What then? If, for purposes of reasoning[27], we were to subtract from suchlike multitudes the least we possibly could, must not that which is subtracted be itself a multitude and not a *one*, if indeed it does not share in the one?

– It must.

– So whenever we examine in this way the very nature itself of that which is other than the *eidos*, whatever amount of it we view will always be unlimited in multitude.

– Most certainly.

– Furthermore, when each portion becomes a portion, it already has boundaries with each of the other portions and with the whole, and the whole has boundaries with the portions.

– Quite so.

– As it seems, when *the others* of *the one* commune with *the one*, then some other thing comes into being in them that imparts mutual limit among them. But, considered in themselves, their nature imparts limitlessness.

– So it appears.

– Thus *the others* of *the one* as wholes and as portions are both limitless and share in limit.

– Indeed.

3 The others are like and unlike themselves and each other

e – Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;

– Πῇ δή;

– Ἧι μέν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ.

– Πάνυ γε.

– Καὶ μὴν ᾗ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτῃ πάντ᾽ ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα.

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Ἧι δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα

159 τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν.

– Ναί.

– Τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία γε ὡς οἷόν τε ἀνομοιότατα.

– Τί μήν;

– Κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοια ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα.

– Κινδυνεύει.

– Οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη.

– Οὕτως.

– Are they then like and unlike each other and themselves?

– How, exactly?

– Insofar as all of them are unlimited according to their own nature, they all bear the same condition.

– Indeed.

– Furthermore, insofar as they all share in limit, in this way also they bear the same condition.

– No doubt.

– And insofar as they happen to be both unlimited and limited, they bear these conditions that are conditions opposite to each other.

– Yes.

– And the opposites are the most unlike possible.

– Of course.

– So according to each condition separately they are like themselves and like each other, but according to both conditions together they are both most opposite and most unlike.

– Likely so.

– In just this way *the others* are like and unlike themselves and one another.

– It is so.

---

[27] «τῇ διανοίᾳ» see footnote #20

4 Further ways in which the others are and are not

<table>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>– Καὶ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα.
– Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.</td>
<td>– Having shown that the others of the one undergo the above, we shall have no trouble finding that they are the same as and other than one another, and both in motion and at rest, and undergo all opposite affections.
– You are right.</td>
</tr>
</table>

Fourth Hypothesis: the others if the one is apart

<table>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>– Οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοποῖμεν δὲ πάλιν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ οὕτω μόνον;
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
– Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθέναι.
– Λέγωμεν γάρ.
– Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι;
– Τί δή;
– Ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων· πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ τό τε ἓν καὶ τἆλλα.
– Πάντα γάρ.
– Οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἓν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τἆλλα.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα.
– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
– Χωρὶς ἄρα;
– Ναί.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν.
– Πῶς γάρ;
– Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τέ ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.</td>
<td>– If we admit these results as evident, shall we examine again whether the others are not so or not only so if the one is [simply and purely] one?
– Yes, by all means.
– Let us say from the beginning: if the one is simply one, what must happen to the others of the one?
– Let us indeed.
– Is it not the case that the one is apart from the others and the others are apart from the one?
– But why, exactly?
– Because clearly besides these there is nothing else that is other than the one and other than the other: we say everything when we say the one and the others.
– Yes, everything.
– Then neither is there anything else besides them by being in which both the one and the others would be in the same [i.e., place, condition or state][28].
– Indeed not.
– Thus the one and the others are never in the same [place, condition or state].
– It seems not.
– Therefore they are apart?
– Yes.
– Moreover we assert that the truly one has no portions.
– Of course not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>– Πῶς γάρ;
– Οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα.
– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
– Οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἓν οὐδέν.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τἆλλα· ἓν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα</td>
<td>– If the one is apart from the others and lacks portions, then neither the one as a whole nor portions are in the other.
– Of course not.
– So in no way will the others share in the one since they do not share in it either as portions or as a whole.
– It seems not.
– In no way therefore are the others one nor have one in them.
– Most certainly not.
– Nor are the others many, then, for if they were,</td>
</tr>
</table>

---

[28] «ἐν ταυτῷ» = "in the same". See footnote #19

e οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται.

– Οὕτως.

– Οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης· εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἴδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός.

– Φαίνεται.

– Ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἃ μηδ᾽ ἑνὸς μετέχοι.

– Ἀδύνατον.

– Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτ᾽ ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ ἀμφότερα **160** τἆλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.

– Ἀληθῆ.

– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ᾽ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἑστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων· εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς **b** ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντῃ πάντως στερομένοις.

– Ἀληθέστατα.

– Οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

– Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

each portion of their whole would be one, but now **the others** of **the one** are neither one nor many nor whole nor portions since they do not share in **the one** in any way.

– Right.

– So then **the others** themselves are neither two nor three nor are two or three contained in them if **the others** in every way lack **the one**.

– It is so.

– So **the others** are neither like nor unlike **the one** nor have likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike and had likeness and unlikeness in them, then **the others** of **the one** would have in them two **eide** that are opposite each other.

– So it appears.

– But it is impossible for that which does not share even in one thing to share in two.

– Impossible.

– Therefore **the others** are neither like nor unlike nor both. If they were like or unlike they would be sharing in either of these **eide** and if both they would share in two opposites. But this proved impossible.

– True.

– So **the others** are neither same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor coming to be nor perishing, nor greater nor smaller nor equal; nor undergo any other such affection. For if **the others** submitted to any of these they would share in one and two and three and odd and even, but it was proven that it is impossible to share in these while they totally lack **the one**.

– Very true.

– Therefore then, if **the one** is [simply and purely] one, it is everything *and* nothing in relation both to itself and also to **the others**.

– Completely true.

Fifth Hypothesis: the one if it is not something

– Εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἆρ᾽ οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο;

– Σκεπτέον γάρ.

– Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ἆρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;

– Διαφέρει μέντοι.

c – Διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν;

– Πᾶν τοὐναντίον.

– Τί δ᾽ εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἆρα ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν;

– Πάνυ γε.

– Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει;

– Fine. Should we not think next what the consequences are if **the one** *is not?*

– Yes we should.

– What exactly is this hypothesis "if **the one** *is not*"? Does it differ from "if **the not-one** *is not*"?

– It most certainly differs.

– Does it merely differ or is saying "if **the not-one** *is not*" totally contrary to **"**if **the one** *is not*"?

– Totally contrary.

– If someone says that largeness is not, or smallness is not, or some other such thing, does he not make clear that in each case he speaks of a different notbeing?

– Indeed.

– When he says if **the one** *is not*, does he now make

– Ἴσμεν.
– Πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲν <γὰρ> ἧττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὔ;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ὧδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι;
– Πάνυ γε.
– Καὶ ἑτεροιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.
– Φαίνεται.
– Καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐλέγετο οὐδ᾽ ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνῳ ἄν τι ἦν οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνου, οὐδ᾽ ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι.
– Καὶ πάνυ γε
– Καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν.
– Ναί.
– Τὰ δ᾽ ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἀλλοῖα;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια;
– Ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν.
– Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη.
– Δῆλον.
– Εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν.
– Ἔοικεν.
– Εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι;
– Πῶς;
– Εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἑνί, οὐκ ἄν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἵου τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἑνός.
– Πάνυ γε.
– Οὐ δεῖ δέ γε.
– Οὐ δῆτα.

clear that he speaks of a not-being other than the others*,* and do we know that of which he speaks?
– We know.
– Therefore, when he says *one*, he speaks of a thing that a) is known, and b) is other than the others, whether he attaches to it being or not-being. A thing that is said not to be is not less known than – and indeed is known to be different from – the others. Not so?
– Necessarily.
– What must be the case if **the one** *is not* ought to at the outset be spelled out in this way: First, it seems that this must precede it: that there be knowledge of it, otherwise we would not know what is said when one spoke the words if **the one** *is not*.
– True.
– And **the others** must be other than it; or can it not be said that it is other than the others?
– Of course.
– So there is otherness in it in addition to knowledge: we do not speak of the otherness of **the others** when we call **the one** other than **the others**, but of its own otherness.
– It appears.
– Furthermore, **the one** that *is not* shares in the '*that*' and the '*something*' and '*this*' and '*toward this*' and '*these*' and in all suchlike. For **the one** would not be spoken of, nor would **the others** than **the one**, nor whether something were *about* it or *of* it, if it did not share either in something related to it or in these others.
– Right.
– It is impossible for **the one** to *be* since it *is not*, but nothing prevents it from sharing in many things. In fact it must if it is to not be that particular one and not a different one. In fact, if that thing which we say *is not* is not even that particular one nor any other, nothing need even be uttered. But if that particular one and none other is the subject of not-being, then it must have a share in that and in many other things.
– Yes, of course.
– And so, it has unlikeness relative to **the others**; because **the others** of **the one**, in being other, are diverse.
– Yes.
– And aren't the diverse those things that are of another kind?
– No doubt.
– And those of another kind aren't they unlike?
– Unlike indeed.
– Therefore, if they are unlike **the one**, obviously the unlike are unlike the unlike.
– Obviously.
– So **the one** has unlikeness with respect to which **the others** are unlike it.
– It seems so.

– Δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι.
– Δεῖ.
– Καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἴσον γ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.
– Ἀδύνατα.
– Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα;
– Ναί.
– Τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα;
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

d – Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα;
– Μετέχει.
– Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης.
– Ἔστι γάρ.
– Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑνί;
– Κινδυνεύει.
– Μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.
– Πάνυ γε.
– Μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεί ἐστιν.
– Ἔστιν.
– Ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;
– Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.
– Ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα.

e – Φαίνεται.
– Τῷ δὴ ἑνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.
– Ἔοικεν.
– Καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ.
– πῶς δή;
– Ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἓν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
– Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

162 – Ἐπειδὴ δέ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν οὐκ ὄν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά πῃ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν.
– Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
– Δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ [εἶναι] ᾖ· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὂν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὂν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας

b δὲ τοῦ <μὴ> εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ

– And if it has unlikeness of *the others*, must it not have likeness of itself?
– How so?
– If *the one* had unlikeness of *the one*, the argument would not be about something like *the one*, nor would the hypothesis be about *one* but about other than *one*.
– Indeed.
– Therefore it must not have unlikeness.
– Certainly not.
– Then *the one* must have likeness of itself.
– It must.
– Moreover it is not equal to *the others*, for if it were equal it would be like them with respect to equality. And both of these are impossible if it is *the one* that *is not*.
– Impossible.
– Since it is not equal to *the others*, must *the others* also be not equal to it?
– They must.
– And the not equal are unequal?
– Yes.
– And the unequal are unequal to unequals?
– No doubt.
– *The one* also shares in inequality, with respect to which *the others* are unequal to it?
– It does.
– But largeness and smallness certainly are aspects of inequality.
– They are.
– Then both largeness and smallness belong to a one such as this?
– Very likely.
– And largeness and smallness always do stand apart from each other.
– Indeed.
– Therefore there always is something between them.
– There is.
– Can you say that anything other than equality is between them?
– Nothing other but this.
– So, where there is largeness and smallness there is also equality between them.
– So it appears.
– It seems that equality, largeness and smallness would all belong to *the one* that *is not*.
– It seems so.
– Furthermore it must also somehow share in substance.
– How, exactly?
– It must be in such state as we argued, because if it is not then we would not be speaking the truth when saying that *the one is not*. But if we were speaking the truth then obviously we were speaking of things that are. Not so?
– Certainly so.

μὴ ὂν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι [μὴ] ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ
τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.
– Ἀληθέστατα.
– Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ
ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἑνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι,
τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἑνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.
– Φαίνεται.
– Καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν.
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ
μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;
– Οὐχ οἷόν τε.

c – Πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν
οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ.
– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
– Μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις· ἢ τί φήσομεν;
– Κίνησις.
– Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὂν ἐφάνη;
– Ναί.
– Οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται.
– Ἔοικεν.
– Καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἓν πέφανται,
ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι
ἔχον.
– Κινδυνεύει.
– Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ
ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι.
– Πῶς γάρ;

d – Οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ᾽ ἄν.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταὐτοῦ γὰρ
οὐδαμοῦ ἅπτεται. ὂν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταὐτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν
ἔν τῳ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι.
– Ἀδύνατον γάρ.
– Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἕν γε μὴ ὂν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν
ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὂν
οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ
ἑνός, εἴπερ ἠλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου
τινός.
– Ὀρθῶς.
– Εἰ δὲ μήτ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταὐτῷ στρέφεται
e μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἆρ᾽ ἄν πῃ ἔτι κινοῖτο;
– Πῶς γάρ;
– Τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ
ἡσυχάζον ἑστάναι.
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὂν ἕστηκέ τε καὶ
κινεῖται.
– Ἔοικεν.
– Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ
163 ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· ὅπῃ γὰρ ἄν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον
οὐκέθ᾽ ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρως.

– And since we claim that we speak of true things we
must say that we speak of things that are.
– We must.
– Therefore, it seems, *the one* that *is non-being*, is.
For if it is not *non-being*, but discharges some of its
being to *non-being*, it would at once be being.
– Most certainly.
– So, if it is to not to be, the being of that which is
not must be tied to *non-being*, just as that which *is*, in
order to be perfectly, must not have *non-being*.
Above all, this is the way in which that which is, is,
and that which *is not*, is not: that which *is*, is so by
sharing of the substance of being a being and by not
sharing of the substance of not being a *non-being* if it
is *to be* perfectly; and that which *is not*, is not so by
not sharing of the non-substance of not being a *non-
being* and by sharing in the substance of being a *non-
being*, if it is *to not be* perfectly.
– Perfectly true.
–Since, then, that which *is* shares in *non-being* and
that which *is not* shares in being, then *the one*,
because it *is not*, must share in *non-being*.
– It must.
– Moreover, substance is evident in *the one* if it *is
not*.
– Evident.
– Non-substance also, if it *is not*.
– No doubt.
– Is it possible for that which is in a certain state to
not be in that state without changing from it?
– It is not possible.
– So every thing that is such that both *is* and *is not* in
a certain state signifies change.
– No doubt.
– And change is motion, shall we say?
– Motion.
– And wasn't *the one* shown to be and not be?
– Yes.
– So it was shown to be and not be in a certain state.
– It seems so.
– So then *the one* that *is not* is shown to be moved
because it changes from being to not being.
– Very likely.
– Moreover, if it is nowhere among things that are (as
indeed it is not, due to its *non-being*) it is not
transported from place to place.
– Of course not.
– Then it is not moved by means of transport.
– No, it is not.
– Nor does it rotate in the same place, because it is
not in contact with the same place, because the same
place is a being. And *the one* that *is not* cannot
possibly *be* in any being.
– Yes, impossible.
– Therefore that which is not cannot rotate in that in
which it is not.

– Οὕτως.
– Κινούμενον δὴ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.
– Ναί.
– Καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Ἧι μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἕν, ἀλλοιοῦται· ᾗ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.
– Φαίνεται.
– Τὸ δ᾽ ἀλλοιούμενον ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας **b** ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι;
 – Ἀνάγκη.
– Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν μὴ ὂν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ᾽ ἀπόλλυται.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– It cannot indeed.
– ***The one,*** either being or *non-being*, cannot be altered from itself, otherwise our discourse would no longer be of ***the one,*** if it is altered from itself, but of some other.
– Right.
– And if it is not altered, nor rotates in place or is transported, does it move in any way?
– Of course not.
– And in fact that which is motionless must be at rest and that which rests must stand still.
– It must.
– So the one that is not seems both to be still and to move.
– It seems.
– And if indeed it moves, it must really be altered. In whichever way it moves, to that same degree it is no longer in the same condition but in a different one.
– Agreed.
– It is precisely by moving that ***the one*** is altered.
– Yes.
– And by not moving at all it is not altered at all.
– Indeed not.
– Insofar as the non-being one moves it is altered, and insofar as it does not move it is not altered.
– Indeed not.
– So ***the one*** that *is not* both is and is not altered.
– So it appears.
– And must not that which is altered come to be other than it was before and perish with respect to its previous condition, and that which is not altered neither come to be nor perish?
– It must.
– Therefore ***the one*** that *is not*, insofar as it is altered, both comes to be and perishes, and insofar as it is not altered neither comes to be nor perishes. And so ***the one*** that *is not* comes to be and perishes and neither comes to be nor perishes.
– Certainly not

Sixth Hypothesis: the one if it is not at all

c – Αὖθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἅπερ καὶ νῦν ἢ ἕτερα.
– Ἀλλὰ χρή.
– Οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν;
– Ναί.
– Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἆρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι;
– Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
– Πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναί τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἁπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ

– Let us go to back to the beginning to see if these matters will prove the same as just now or different.
– We need to.
– Shall we say then: if ***the one*** *is not*, what are the consequences with respect to it?
– Yes.
– When we say 'is not', we mean nothing else except that substance is absent from that thing which we say is not, don't we?
– Nothing else.
– When we say that something is not, do we say that in a way it is and in a way it is not, or does saying 'is not' mean this: that the thing that is not, simply is not

ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν;
 – Ἁπλούστατα μὲν οὖν.
 – Οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὂν οὔτε ἄλλως

d οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν.
 – Οὐ γάρ.
 – Τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἦν ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν;
 – Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
 – Ὧι δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ᾽ ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ᾽ ἀπολλύοι αὐτό.
 – Πῶς γάρ;
 – Τῷ ἑνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἑκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς.
 – Εἰκός.
 – Οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἓν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας.
 – Οὐ φαίνεται.

e – Οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον.
 – Ἀληθῆ.
 – Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι;
 – Ἀνάγκη.
 – Οὐδὲ μὴν ἑστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἑστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινι δεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι.
 – Τῷ αὐτῷ· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
 – Οὕτω δὴ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὂν μήτε ποτὲ ἑστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.
 – Μὴ γὰρ οὖν.
 – Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων· ἤδη γὰρ

164 ἂν τούτου μετέχον [ὄντος] οὐσίας μετέχοι.
 – Δῆλον.
 – Οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν.
 – Οὐ γάρ.
 – Οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιότης οὔτε πρὸς αὑτὸ οὔτε πρὸς τἆλλα εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ.
 – Οὐ φαίνεται.
 – Τί δέ; τἆλλα ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;
 – Οὐκ ἔστιν.
 – Οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια οὔτε ταὐτὰ οὔθ᾽ ἕτερά ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα.
 – Οὐ γάρ.
 – Τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τὶ ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ

b τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται;
 – Οὐκ ἔσται.
 – Οὕτω δὴ ἓν οὐκ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ.
 – Οὔκουν δὴ ἔοικέν γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν.

anywhere in any way, nor in any way shares in substance?
– Simply is not.
– Nor, therefore, could the non-being share in substance in any other way whatsoever.
– Indeed not.
– And coming to be and perishing is nothing else than sharing in substance and giving up substance?
– Nothing else.
– Whatever has no share in substance neither receives it nor gives it up.
– Of course not.
– *The one* then, which in no way is, can neither have nor receive nor give up substance in any way at all.
– So it seems.
– So then *the one* that *is not* neither perishes nor comes to be, since it does not share in substance at all.
– It appears not.
– Nor is it altered in any way, for it would be coming to be and perishing if it did.
– True.
– If it is not altered then it must not move.
– It must not.
– Nor can we say that whatever is nowhere is at rest, for what is at rest must be in some place always the same.
– The same place, of course.
– Therefore we repeat that what is not is never either at rest or in motion.
– Never, indeed.
– Moreover, nothing that *is* belongs to it because if it shared in this thing it would be sharing in substance.
– Clearly.
– Thus, neither largeness not smallness nor equality belongs to it.
– Indeed not.
– Moreover, neither likeness nor otherness, either with respect to itself or to the others, belongs to it.
– It appears not.
– What then? Is it possible for other things to belong to it if nothing must belong to it?
– It is not.
– Then *the others* are neither its like nor unlike, and neither the same as nor different from it.
– Indeed not.
– What, then? With respect to that which *is not*, is there an 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some' or 'this' or 'of this' or 'other' or 'to other' or 'before' or 'after' or 'now' or knowledge or opinion or sense or description or name or any other being?
– There will not be.
– Thus *the one* that *is not* has no status whatsoever.
– It seems that indeed it has none whatsoever.

– Ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι.

– Λέγωμεν γάρ.

– Ἄλλα μέν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.

– Οὕτω.

– Εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερά ἐστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ

c ἕτερον;

– Ἔγωγε.

– Ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου;

– Ναί.

– Καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται.

– Ἀνάγκη.

– Τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.

– Οὐ γάρ.

– Ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις.

– Ὀρθῶς.

– Κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί· κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἷά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός. ἀλλ᾽

d ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἑνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

– Ὀρθότατα.

– Τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τἆλλα, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν.

– Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

– Οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὢν δὲ οὔ, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται;

– Οὕτω.

e – Καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων.

– Πάνυ γε.

– Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται.

– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

– Καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα

165 πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων.

– Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

– Καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος.

– Εἰκός.

– Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον

– Let us further discuss what must happen to *the others* if *the one* is not.

– Let us.

– Somehow they must *be* other, for if they were not even other, there could be no discussion about *the others*.

– It is so.

– But if the discussion is about *the others*, the others are diverse. Don't you say that the 'other' and the 'diverse' are the same thing?

– I do.

– And of course we say that the diverse is diverse from a diverse thing and the other is other than another?

– Yes.

– And to *the others*, if they are to be other, corresponds something to which they are other.

– Necessarily.

– And what could that be? Surely they are not other than *the one*, since *the one* is not.

– Indeed not.

– Then they are each other's other. This is their only alternative or else they are other than nothing.

– Right.

– So they are each other's other by multitudes, because they cannot be one by one since *the one is not*. But, it seems, each of their masses is unlimited in multitude, and if you take what seems the smallest, all of a sudden and as if in a sleeping dream, instead of one it seems to be many and instead of smallest it seems immense in comparison to its fragments.

– Absolutely right.

– *The others* are other than each other by means of such masses if they are to be other than *the on*e that *is not*.

– Quite so.

– So there will be many masses, each seeming but not being one, because *the one* is not.

– Yes.

– And they would seem to have numbers, if they each seem to be one while they are many.

– Indeed.

– And some among them will seem even and others odd – but not truly so, if *the one is not*.

– Not truly indeed.

– Moreover we assert that there will seem to be a minimum in them; and this minimum appears to be many and great compared to each of the many that are small.

– No doubt.

– And each mass will seem to be equal to the many and small, for it would not transition from greater to lesser in appearance before it seemed to come

ἔχων;
– Πῇ δή;
– Ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι

b τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός.
– Ἀληθέστατα.
– Θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ· ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ λαμβάνοιτ᾽ ἄν.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

c – Οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἓν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἓν ἕκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος;
– Ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.
– Οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα τἆλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός.
– Δεῖ γάρ.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι;
– Πῇ δή;
– Οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι.

d – Πάνυ γε.
– Προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς.
– Οὕτω.
– Καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτούς τε αὑτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις.
– Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἁπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἑστῶτας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ

e τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν.
– Ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

between them, and this would be the appearance of equality.
– Plausibly.
– And although it has boundary with another mass, by itself it has neither beginning nor end nor middle?
– How so?
– Because whenever one conceives any of these as features of the masses, before a beginning another beginning appears, and after an end another end follows, and in the middle others more middle than the middle, ever smaller, because each of them cannot be grasped as one, since *the one is not*.
– Very true.
– So I think that every being that is grasped mentally must be broken into pieces, for mass somehow is always grasped without *the one*.
– Yes, of course.
– Seen from afar with fuzzy vision, must not such a thing appear one? But seen up close with sharp perception, must not each appear in unlimited multitude, as it is devoid of *the one* – given that *the one is not*?
– Absolutely it must.
– Thus, if *the one* is not and *the others* of *the one* are, each of *the others* must appear unlimited and limited and one and many.
– Indeed they must.
– And would they appear to be like and unlike?
– How so?
–Like things in a shaded drawing, all of which to a distant observer appear as one, undergoing the same condition and being alike.
– Of course.
– But when he approaches they appear many and different and by the apparition of difference diverse and unlike themselves.
– Yes.
– And these masses must appear like and unlike themselves and each other.
– Yes, of course.
– And also the same and other than each other, and in contact and apart from themselves, and moving in all motions and at rest in every way, and coming to be and perishing and neither of the two – and all such things that we could easily enumerate – if there are many while *the one is not*.
– Very true indeed.

Eighth Hypothesis: the others if the one is not at all

– Ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι.
– Εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν.
– Οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα.

– Returning to the beginning once more, let us say what must be the case if *the one is not* but *the others* are.
– Let us say then.
– To be sure, *the others* are not one.

– Πῶς γάρ;
– Οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἕν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕν, ἅπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδ᾽ ἂν πολλὰ εἴη.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα.
– Οὐ γάρ.

166

– Οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά.
– Τί δή;
– Ὅτι τἆλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῴ ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
– Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

b

– Ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, οὐδὲ δοξάζεταί τι τῶν ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον.
– Ἀδύνατον γάρ.
– Ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά.
– Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
– Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια.
– Οὐ γάρ.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ᾽ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἆλλα, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι.
– Ἀληθῆ.

c

– Οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποιμεν;
– Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
– Εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτ᾽ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.
– Ἀληθέστατα.

– Of course not.
– Nor are they many, because in being many they would be infused with *the one*, since if none of them is one then all of them are nothing and by being nothing they are not many.
– True.
– And because *the one* is not infused in *the others*, *the others* are neither many nor one.
– Indeed not.
– And they do not appear to be either one or many.
– Why exactly?
– Because *the others* have no communion anywhere in any way with things that are not, and no part of things that are not are near *the others*, because there is no part in things that are not.
– True.
– Nor is there a notion or image of that which is not relative to *the others*, nor is that which is not conceived in any way whatsoever over *the others*.
– Of course not.
– If then *the one is not*, nothing of *the others* is conceived either as one or many, for without *the one* it is impossible to conceive many.
– Impossible indeed.
– If then *the one is not*, *the others* neither are nor are conceived either as one or as many.
– It seems not.
– Neither like nor unlike, then.
– No.
– Nor indeed the same nor other, nor in contact nor apart, nor any of the other things that earlier we described them as appearing: *the others* neither are nor appear to be any of these if *the one is not*.
– True.
– So if we were to say that if *the one is not* then nothing is, would we be speaking rightly?
– Most certainly.
– Let us therefore say this in addition: that, as it seems, whether *the one is* or *is not*, both it and *the others*, both in relation to themselves and each other, all in every way both *are* and *are not* and appear and do not appear.
– Very true.